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1. CONTEXT 
Agricultural market developments have attracted considerable attention recently, due to 
increasing consumer food prices and excessive short term price fluctuations of agricultural 
commodity prices. Agricultural commodity prices have displayed historically high levels 
of volatility with very sharp variations in short periods of time, commencing with the 
commodity price boom in 2007, followed by the steep fall in the wake of the economic 
crisis and the recent sharp rebound in 2010.  
Although some price variation is functional to agricultural markets, extreme or excessive 
fluctuations cause major uncertainties for producers. Indeed, the impact of excessive price 
fluctuations on food production is a source of concern for farmers (but also others along 
the supply chain). This issue has brought a lot of attention to the role of market 
instruments in stabilising markets, as well as stabilising farmers' incomes.  
Another source of concern is the cost of inputs. For the past five years, input costs have, 
on average, increased faster than output prices, leaving farmers with a 'squeezed' margin 
between fluctuating revenues and structurally higher input costs. Therefore, merely 
focusing on stabilising the prices farmers receive is no longer sufficient in stabilising 
farmers' incomes. Rather, it requires a more complex approach, taking into account also 
the cost side of the income equation1.  
The aim of this note is to review the existing market instruments in the context of 
emerging factors influencing agricultural markets and the objectives set out in the 
Communication on The CAP towards 2020, of stabilising markets and contributing to farm 
income, improving competitiveness of agriculture, and enhancing the value share of 
agriculture along the food chain. The resulting options for policy change are then assessed 
with regard to their potential economic, environmental and administrative impact as well 
as their compliance with WTO obligations. 
1.1. The current policy framework 
The Single Common Market Organisation (sCMO)2 provides the legal framework for the 
market instruments currently available with regard to domestic markets, trade with third 
countries and rules regarding competition. A brief overview of these instruments is 
presented below, organised according to their scope for (internal) market management, 
border control and supply chain functioning.3  
 
 
                                                 
1  See Annex 6 on Risk Management. 
2  COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common 
organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products 
3  Annex I provides a more detailed description of current instruments, while additional elements are 
referred to in Annexes II and VI on quality policy and consumer related policies. 
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Market management measures  
Private storage aid represents a first layer of market management, as it is triggered, as a 
general rule, at a price level which is closer to market prices (above the intervention price 
level). The aid is mandatory for butter and optional for white sugar, beef, pig meat, sheep 
and goat meat, and olive oil. Private storage has been applied several times for meat 
products, and in 2008 for olive oil, whereas due to the market condition it has not been 
used for beef and sugar (and sheep meat only in the 1990s).   
Public intervention is foreseen for cereals, rice, skimmed milk powder (SMP), butter and 
beef. Intervention prices, triggering mechanisms, calendars and quantitative ceilings vary 
across sectors. For cereals (with the exception of wheat) and rice, opening of buying-in is 
decided by the Commission. 
Special intervention measures and special measures in case of market disturbances can be 
implemented at member state or regional level under specific circumstances for certain 
sectors: to combat animal diseases for animal products or in case of loss in consumer 
confidence (for poultry only), or in cases where prices on the EU market rise and/or fall 
significantly.  
Production quotas have been an important instrument for market stabilisation, in sectors 
facing overproduction, notably the dairy, sugar and wine sectors. Dairy and sugar quotas 
are set to expire following the respective 2014/2015 quota year, following earlier decisions 
on the CMO in 2003 and 2004 respectively. The wine planting regime is set to end from 1 
January 2016 (although some national restrictions may remain until 2018).  
Other instruments whose main aim is not that of supporting markets could have an indirect 
impact on market stability or assist in insulating farmers from extreme volatilities in 
commodity markets, such as the existing food programme for the most deprived persons4. 
Other programmes, like the school milk5 and school fruit6 schemes provide aid for the 
distribution of these products under certain conditions to schoolchildren.  
EU quality policy instruments provide producers the possibility to add value-added to their 
products by the protection of certain marketing designations in the marketplace (e.g. 
geographical indications, organic label, and traditional specialities). Thus, a retailer can 
only offer such products by purchasing them from the limited volume of certified products. 
This ensures farmers participating in quality schemes7 a price premium and a certain 
protection against short term commodity price fluctuations.  
Border protection  
Common import tariffs apply for most agricultural products. Tariff-rate quotas are also 
used for various products. Imports can enter with lower tariffs or even duty and quota free 
under EU preferential agreements. There are safeguard provisions (especially additional 
duties) should imports reach trigger levels (high volumes and/or low prices). As a 
                                                 
4  http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/most-deprived-persons/index_en.htm 
5  http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/milk/schoolmilk/index_en.htm  
6  http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/sfs/index_en.htm 
7  See Annex II on the inter-relation of EU quality instruments and market measures. 
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combined result of CAP reform, WTO rules and world market developments, the use of 
export refunds has significantly decreased in terms of expenditure, quantities and product 
coverage.  
Measures linked to food chain functioning 
The sCMO is the common legal base for recognition by Member States of certain forms of 
producer cooperation in selected sectors.  
Producer organisations (POs) are operating in the fruit and vegetables (F&V), olive oil, 
hops, wine and tobacco sectors, although with different objectives and means.8 The current 
aim of POs in the F&V sector is to ensure that production is planned and adjusted to 
demand, both in terms of quality and quantity; to concentrate supply and to place products 
produced by its members on the market, and to optimise production costs and stabilise 
producer prices. Each PO has to market the production of its members and can manage one 
or more of those actions. Specific rules exist for association and recognition of POs and 
associations of producer organisations (APOs) in the F&V sector. Recognition - either 
POs or APOs - is merely an 'entrance requirement', and not a support measure in itself. 
EU funds to POs in the F&V sector are provided in the form of contribution to the creation 
of operational funds, co-financed in most cases at 50 % and limited to 4.1 % of the value 
of marketed production. Support is currently available under rural development to foster 
the setting up and the administrative operation of producers groups (PGs)9 in EU-12 
Member States.  
Interbranch organisations (IBOs): Member States are obliged to recognise IBO 
organisations in the F&V, olive oil and table olives, and tobacco sectors. Common rules 
are also laid down for IBOs in the wine sector and under proposal for the dairy sector. The 
disciplines decided by the IBO members are only effective for the members of the IBO. 
For example, when the French F&V IBO decides quality rules for apples, they do not 
apply to apples produced in other Member States or third countries. The possibility to 
extend certain rules issued by an IBO to national non-member producers are however 
possible in the F&V sector. As for POs and APOs, recognition is merely an 'entrance 
requirement', and not a support measure in itself. 
1.2. Emerging factors 
The CAP reform process started with the MacSharry reform in 1992 aimed to increase 
market orientation of the sector and thereby contribute to enhancing its 
competitiveness. This has been achieved through the progressive reduction of support 
prices (see Figure 1) and other support instruments, while at the same time accompanied 
by the introduction of direct payments with the aim of ensuring a certain degree of income 
stability to producers.10 
                                                 
8  While the available legislation provides for POs in the silkworms sector, none exist currently.    
9  Producer groups are defined as farmers organisations that have not yet achieved the status of recognised 
producer organisations 
10  The Agricultural Policy Perspectives Brief on The CAP in perspective: from market intervention to 
policy innovation, January 2011 provides an overview of policy developments since the MacSharry 
reform. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/app-briefs/01_en.pdf  
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During the Health check of the CAP, intervention has been modified in a way that keeps 
its role as a safety-net for farmers in case of market disruptions.11 It was also decided 
to gradually increase milk quotas in order to pave the way towards a soft landing for the 
dairy sector in 2015, when quotas will expire. 
Intervention prices for cereals have been lowered in total by 45 % in nominal terms (30 % 
in the 1992 Reform and by 15 % in Agenda 2000), and through abolition of monthly 
increments during the Health Check reform. The intervention price for wheat has been 
lower than both the EU and world market prices in the last decade, and EU market prices 
have been following the same trend as world prices.  
Figure 1: Reductions in EU price support since 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DG Agriculture and Rural Development. 
In the beef sector intervention prices have been lowered by a cumulated 50 % in nominal 
terms following cuts under the MacSharry and Agenda 2000 reforms. The intervention 
price for beef has been much lower than EU and world market prices during the last eight 
years, with EU prices following the same trend as international prices. 
SMP and butter intervention prices have been reduced by 15 % and 25 % respectively 
since Agenda 2000. SMP support prices have been further reduced under the 'mini milk 
package' in 2008 to take account of protein standardisation.12 In the case of butter, the 
average EU market price seems to have been reflecting trends in the international market 
since 2007 although the EU market price remains in general above the world price level.  
Under the ongoing WTO negotiations, the EU has committed itself to phase-out export 
refunds on the condition of the elimination of all similar measures by other developed 
countries. A successful completion of the Doha Development Round of agricultural trade 
negotiations would imply that these instruments could no longer be used. 
                                                 
11  Annex III provides an overview of the implications on competitiveness between Member States in three 
main sectors (dairy, wheat and beef) based on comparing operating costs and total receipts with respect 
to intervention price levels 
12  COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) 1152/2007 of 26 September 2007 
Cumulative % reduction in price support from 1991 to 2009
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
Soft w heat Durum w heat Beef Rice Butter SMP Sugar
In nominal terms In real terms
 7 
These policy changes (as well as the introduction of the mechanisms of modulation and 
financial discipline) have significantly changed the level and composition of the financial 
support to the agricultural sector. While in the past market and export support used to 
constitute the bulk of the CAP expenditure, most of the CAP budget is now spent on 
decoupled payments and direct aids. Over the period 2007-2009 market intervention 
captured only 9 % of the CAP budget. Figure 2 provides an overview of CAP budget 
expenditure over the period 1980-2009.  
Figure 2: The path of CAP expenditure 1980–2009 (in 2007 constant prices) 
 
Source: European Commission, DG AGRI 
1.2.1. Increased exposure to external factors 
The move towards greater market orientation exposes farmers to higher price volatility as 
instability on world commodity markets may permeate to EU markets more easily due to 
reduced market intervention and more open markets.  
Increased price volatility is mainly expected to stem from the continued integration of 
global commodity markets with financial markets and the closer link between agriculture 
and non-agricultural commodity markets, as well as the impact of climate change.  
Based on recent developments, agricultural prices are expected to continue to move in line 
with non-agricultural prices (especially energy and minerals), particularly as the biofuel 
sector is foreseen to reinforce the link between agricultural commodities and energy prices 
(both on the supply and demand side), allowing volatility on energy markets to affect 
agricultural prices. 13  
Climate change has far reaching effects on global production patterns, with the frequency 
and magnitude of extreme weather conditions increasing the uncertainties of supply and 
therefore the possibility of further excessive price volatility. In the short term, overall EU 
                                                 
13  The Agricultural Markets Perspectives Brief on High commodity prices and volatility …what lies behind 
the roller coaster ride?, June 2011 analyses the factors driving price developments in agricultural 
markets. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis/tradepol/commodityprices/market-briefs/01_en.pdf 
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food production is not expected to be greatly altered by climate change, but greater 
differences will arise between countries. Therefore climate change related risks on the 
agricultural sector, food security and rural economy are an increasing cause for concern.  
Another issue related to the relationship between agricultural and non-agricultural prices 
emerges clearly when looking at input and output price trends. Figure 3 displays the 
evolution of agricultural input and output prices for the EU-27 since 1996.  
The Figure reveals that in the past, input costs (fertilizers, gas prices, etc.) were decreasing 
on average, albeit at a much slower rate than the decrease of output prices received by 
farmers. This narrowing gap between output and input prices was compensated by 
productivity gains. This trend has been exacerbated during the 2007-2008 price boom and 
subsequent price drop, with input prices increasing at a higher rate during the boom and 
declining less during the price drop, compared to output prices. As such, the gap between 
the two price indices has widened significantly, causing a margin 'squeeze' for farmers 
while increasing the volatility of farm income. In recent years the productivity gains were 
not sufficient to compensate for the deteriorating terms of trade in agriculture.14  
Figure 3: Evolution of agricultural input and output prices for EU-2715 
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Source: Eurostat. 
1.2.2. Uncertainties of current market prospects  
Based on the most recent agricultural market perspectives available from different 
sources16 commodity prices are projected to stay firmly above EU reference price levels 
over the medium term. According to the DG AGRI Prospects for agricultural markets and 
                                                 
14  The Farm Economics Brief on Income developments in EU farms, June 2011 analyses the factors 
driving income developments in EU agriculture. 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/pdf/Brief201101.pdf 
15  Note that input and output prices are reflected in indices, thus the actual prices are not comparable. 
16  DG AGRI 2010, FAPRI 2011 and OECD-FAO 2011,. 
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income in the EU 2010-2020,17 agricultural prices would be supported by the growth in 
global food demand, the long-term decline in food crop productivity growth, and by the 
development of the biofuel sector.  
While the expected demand growth resulting from the assumed economic recovery and 
mandatory biofuel mandates should support production expansion, EU output would 
remain under its full potential as the expected increase in input costs would limit the 
profitability of production. As such, the means to improve profit allocation along the 
food chain will remain an important element. In addition, crop yields are expected to 
continue their declining rate of growth observed during the previous decade.  
The assumed appreciation of the euro would further weaken the competitiveness of EU 
exports on world markets, leading to a loss in world market share at a time when global 
demand is expected to grow at a relatively fast pace. The deteriorating competitiveness of 
the EU under the current setting is further emphasized in the analysis of alternative 
assumptions on yield and global demand growth rates. Therefore, in order to enable 
producers to make the most of market opportunities, the efforts towards improved 
market orientation should be maintained.  
Although commodity markets are expected to remain balanced over the outlook period 
without the need for market intervention, the SMP market in particular, could remain 
sensitive to global supply-demand developments over the near term, given the level of EU 
intervention stocks accumulated during the milk crisis in support of the market.18  
In addition, the large number of uncertainties and risks surrounding the market 
prospects (such as the pace of economic recovery, future changes in the policy 
environment, the path of technological change, etc.) highlight the need for an effective 
safety net as well as risk management instruments.  
1.2.3. Uneven distribution of value added along the food chain 
The food supply chain has undergone important structural changes over the past decade, 
with the value-added increasingly created in sectors downwards the chain, primarily in the 
distribution sector and in the food industry. Analysis presented in the Communication 
from the Commission on a better functioning food supply chain19 shows that the share of 
the agricultural sector in the total value added of the food supply chain has dropped from 
31 % in 1995 to 24 % in 2005 while the respective shares of the food processing, food 
wholesale and food retail sectors have increased from 31 % to 33 %, 11 % to 13 % and 
27 % to 30 % respectively. 
                                                 
17  The prospects assume a status quo policy environment, economic stability and relatively favourable 
world market perspectives. The CAP is assumed to follow the Health Check decisions, and global trade 
policy to respect the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. Macroeconomic assumptions include a 
gradual and modest EU GDP growth at around 2 % p.a. and a steady appreciation of the euro to around 
1.47 USD/EUR. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/caprep/prospects2010/index_en.htm 
18  Since publication of the prospects the SMP market has been stable, supported by strong demand and 
limited global supply, enabling a gradual de-stocking from intervention without adversely affecting the 
markets.  
19  Staff working document on The evolution of value-added repartition along the European food supply 
chain accompanying the 2009 Communication from the Commission. 
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An important factor behind this increase in the dispersion of repartition of value-added has 
been the relative evolution of output prices vis-à-vis input prices, such that moving 
downwards along the chain output prices have increased at higher rates than input prices 
(cf. previous section for the implications on producer margins).  
In addition to the falling share of value added for agriculture, commodity and consumer 
prices have displayed diverging trends over the period 2000-2010, with a relatively stable 
increase in food producer and consumer prices compared to the more volatile prices of 
agricultural commodities (Figure 4), and resulting in a widening gap between commodity 
and consumer prices.  
Since 2007, there has been a significant change in the price transmission pattern along the 
chain, such that on the one hand the magnitude of price variations for food producer and 
consumer prices are lower than commodity price changes, and on the other hand the speed 
of price transmission has slowed going downwards along the chain, while remaining 
instantaneous for transmission upwards the chain. The slow and asymmetric 
transmission of price changes delays necessary adjustments and helps prolong 
market inefficiencies along the chain and can therefore exacerbate price volatility in 
commodity markets20. 
Figure 4 Price trends along the EU food supply chain, 2007-2011 
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Source: European Commission – DG Economic and Financial Affairs, based on Eurostat data 
Evidence for the apparent 'stickiness' of consumer prices has been demonstrated during the 
recent dairy crisis and its aftermath, where the sharp decline in dairy commodity prices in 
2008 failed to translate fully into lower dairy prices at consumer levels. Dairy consumer 
prices exhibited a 'rocket and feather' evolution pattern in which dairy consumer prices 
were fast to rise (along with dairy commodity prices) but slow to decrease (when dairy 
commodity prices fell), preventing demand for dairy products to adjust to lower 
commodity prices, eventually slowing down price recovery and exacerbating the impact of 
low prices on milk producers. 
                                                 
20   From Analysis of price transmission along the food supply chain in the EU, an accompanying document 
to the Communication on A better functioning food supply chain in Europe COM(2009) 591 
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The dairy crisis has also raised awareness of the significant tensions in contractual 
relations between actors of the chain and the lack of price transparency along the chain. 
The problems with contractual relations stem from the diversity of actors active in the 
chain and their differences in bargaining power. This is exacerbated by the lack of price 
transparency along the food supply chain that prevents market signals to reach 
economic agents in time and thus hampers the proper functioning of the market. 
As such, recent developments in the dairy sector revealed important inefficiencies 
regarding the functioning of the food supply chain, with relation to price transmission, 
price transparency and bargaining power, bringing to the fore the role that improved 
producer cooperation, and producer organisations in particular, could play in alleviating 
these inefficiencies and providing producers with an improved share of the value added, 
particularly in the context of greater market orientation and high input cost environment.  
1.3. The case for a review 
The system of market instruments is very articulated and complex. As shown in 
Section 1.1, the sCMO is characterised by a complex structure of measures. Market 
management tools currently in place have been designed and progressively modified - 
along the CAP reform path - based on specific needs in the various sectors. This has led to 
a very complex and articulated architecture with a set of intervention tools, whose relative 
importance, main parameters, and implementation may differ widely between sectors.  
Intervention already acts as a safety net. The intervention system has been 
progressively modified over the years. Support and/or reference prices have been reduced 
to levels that provide a safety-net in terms of severe market disruption and no longer 
represent a market outlet for farmers. Changes in policy instruments may raise the need for 
certain products to be added to the list of products covered by intervention and/or private 
storage aids.  
It is vital that the Commission has the possibility to intervene quickly under urgent 
circumstances in all sectors, while under the current framework disturbance clauses 
provide support for a limited number of sectors in case of certain crisis situations. 
Production quotas are set to expire. Quotas provide rigidities and prevent the industry to 
respond rapidly to market developments. By putting limits to economies of scale, they also 
indirectly slow down the development of innovative bio-based products, therefore 
hampering the development of the bioeconomy. In the future, alternatives, including a 
non-disruptive end of sugar quotas, need to be examined to bring about greater efficiency 
and competitiveness for the sector. The abolition of milk quotas has been assessed in the 
context of the Health Check of the CAP. 
Improving the functioning of the food supply chain is deemed necessary in a context 
of increased market orientation and high input cost environment, particularly to re-balance 
the bargaining power along the food chain. Imbalance of bargaining power in the food 
chain is a structural problem. This can mean that farmers receive a limited share of the 
value-added in the chain, which is often retained by other actors. Moreover, without well-
functioning transmission of market signals, the long-term prospects of the farm sector and 
its share of the value added generated by the whole food chain are in jeopardy. Lack of 
transparency on price formation along the chain is considered one of the main problems as 
to why primary producers are not in all cases receiving accurate prices.  
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2. OBJECTIVES  
Continued market orientation would be needed to maintain the competitiveness of EU 
agriculture. To do so it is necessary to keep the overall market orientation of the CAP 
while providing a safety net for farmers in case of strong market disruptions, which 
does not lead to unsustainable public stocks, but contribute to the stability of commodity 
markets and farm income.  
The whole system of market measures is complex; therefore the simplification of the 
system, its implementation and control will surely lead to benefits to farmers and public 
institutions.   
Tight producer margins may be alleviated by improving distribution of value added 
along the food chain through strengthening bargaining power of farmers, promoting more 
effective contractual relations and enhancing price transmission and transparency along 
the food chain. In particular, it is deemed necessary to foster cooperation among producers 
as well as increase awareness and reinforce the responsibility of the operators in the food 
chain to better take into account market signals and adapt supply to demand. This is 
certainly desirable across all sectors, although the extent of the problems is not uniform.  
3. OPTIONS 
The options presented here relate to the objectives and are not mutually exclusive; they 
may be inserted in any of the general policy options (i.e. adjustment, integration and 
refocus) as outlined and examined in the synthesis report on The CAP towards 2020 
Impact Assessment of Alternative Policy Options. 
3.1. Simplify and streamline existing instruments  
Simplification and streamlining could be achieved through the adjustment of the current 
system without changing support levels. The general architecture of the market 
management tools would not change (including border measures), although corrections 
could be introduced to streamline and simplify existing market instruments where 
appropriate.  
Main changes: 
• Rearrange and streamline special intervention measures and disturbance clauses, 
through an horizontal instrument that may include two kinds of actions/situations: i) 
market disturbances in all sectors, and ii) mitigate market impact from animal or 
public health risks in animal products, with a review of the product coverage and the 
possibility of urgent delegating acts. 
• The sugar quota scheme (including isoglucose) would be abolished, either following 
the 2015/16 marketing year or phased out by 2017/18 through two successive annual 
quota increases of 3% (for both sugar and isoglucose) in 2015/16 and 2016/17, while 
maintaining the support prices.21 
                                                 
21  Please note that the abolition of milk quotas and planting rights in the wine sector are not covered in this 
reform package and are therefore outside of the scope of the impact assessment. 
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• Intervention: Reference/intervention prices remain unchanged, but it could be 
considered to remove the current fixed quantities and/or fixed buying in prices. 
Removal of automatic purchases at a fixed price up to the quantitative ceilings for 
common wheat, butter and SMP. The system will open automatically via tendering 
procedure for wheat, butter and SMP, while opening would be optional for barley, 
maize, rice and beef. Durum wheat and sorghum would be removed from the list of 
eligible products.  
• Private storage aid: the aid would be foreseen for butter, beef, pig meat, sheep and 
goat meat, white sugar, and olive oil. Optional private storage aid for SMP and flax 
fibre would be considered, while the aid for sugar would be removed with the 
abolition of the sugar quota. An alternative approach foresees private storage as an 
optional tool only, with butter no longer eligible for mandatory aid. An additional 
option is to extend the aid to other products by means of delegated acts in the light of 
market circumstances. 
3.2. Improve the food chain functioning 
This option sets out the objective to enhance the share of value added for agriculture in the 
food chain by improving the bargaining power of farmers, their contractual relations and 
price transparency along the food chain through fostering cooperation among producers. 
While for farmers the participation to horizontal cooperation will continue to be on a 
voluntary basis, the framework for cooperation would be improved following three 
alternative approaches with regard to the level of regulation: i) flexible cooperation, ii) 
enhanced cooperation and iii) regulated cooperation.  
i) Flexible cooperation 
While this option does not foresee additional changes to the CAP other than that already in 
process (i.e. milk package of 201022), it considers the possibility of a more efficient use of 
measures currently available, by supporting pro-competitive cooperation between farmers. 
Of most importance is the better use of the wide range of possibilities farmers have under 
the current competition rules in order to engage in several forms of cooperation, relating to 
joint production and marketing, including a consolidation of production assets (in co-
operatives), rationalisation of marketing activities and/or vertical integration into the 
downstream collection and processing stages. This option could include measures aimed at 
raising farmers' awareness of these possibilities, which are currently often not taken 
advantage of, through the farm advisory system and rural development measures 
promoting knowledge and innovation (e.g. information actions).23 
ii) Enhanced cooperation 
This option expands on the flexible approach by providing greater legal certainty for 
cooperation in the form of producer organisations, associations of producer organisations 
and interbranch organisations. Accordingly, Member States shall recognize producer 
organisations (POs) and associations of producer organisations (APOs) in all sectors 
                                                 
22  COM (2010) 728 of 9 December 2010 
23  As described in section 1.3.2. of Annex 7 on Research and Innovation 
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covered by the sCMO, including those where it is not foreseen in the existing legislation. 
POs may pursue any (or several) of the following objectives: 
• planning production and adjusting production to demand, particularly in terms of 
quality and quantity; 
• concentrating supply and placing the products produced by its members in the 
market;  
• optimising production costs and stabilising producer prices; 
• protecting and improving the environment; 
• providing information and improving knowledge and transparency of production 
and markets; 
• improving quality and participation in quality labelling schemes. 
Rules for associations of producer organisations (APOs) would be based on the existing 
legislation for the fruit and vegetable, wine and olive sectors. 
Member States shall recognise interbranch organisations (IBOs) in all sectors covered by 
the sCMO, including those where it is not foreseen today, provided that the IBOs 
• are made up of representatives of economic activities linked to the production of, 
trade in, and/or processing of products in one or more sectors; 
• are formed on the initiative of all or some of the organisations or associations 
which constitute them; 
• pursue a specific aim, such as improving knowledge and the transparency of 
production and the market, helping to coordinate better the way the products are 
placed on the market, developing methods and instruments for improving product 
quality at all stages of production and marketing, developing methods and 
instruments for improving product quality, accessing specific quality market 
segments, etc. 
 Support for setting up producer groups (PGs) would be provided as a single measure 
under rural development policy for all sectors covered by the sCMO, in all Member States. 
As such, the existing specific support in the fruit and vegetables sector would become 
redundant. 
iii) Regulated cooperation  
This approach extends the measures suggested under the enhanced cooperation approach, 
for example to include the obligation to use written contracts, and the permission of 
collective bargaining by POs, in particular derogation from the prohibition on price fixing. 
Such measures would follow a sector approach and would be based on ad-hoc impact 
assessments. Limits would be imposed in terms of market coverage.  
In the case of sugar, in view of the imbalance between beet and sugar producers after the 
phase out of quotas, and of existing obligatory price and contract requirements, an 
obligation for written beet delivery contracts should be introduced. 
Specific provisions would be applicable to the milk and milk products sectors, based on 
the Commission proposal following the conclusions of the High Level Group on milk, as 
regards contractual relations. These provisions would allow POs or APOs constituted by 
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dairy farmers to negotiate contract terms, including price, with a dairy processor. In order 
to avoid negative impacts on competition on the dairy market, appropriate quantitative 
limits would be applied on the scope of POs and APOs with regard to production volumes. 
Furthermore, these provisions would be subject to review in order to assess their efficiency 
and whether they should continue to apply. 
General considerations regarding producer cooperation 
Attention would be given to certain activities of producer and interbranch organisations, in 
order to avoid negative impacts, such as the partitioning of markets, affecting the sound 
operation of the sCMO, distorting or eliminating competition at national or EU level, 
entailing price fixing, or creating discrimination.  
In particular, the following issues are at stake: i) potential risk of excessive producers 
bargaining power or even producer monopoly, which would be as negative as any other 
monopoly, ii) potential impact in medium and small enterprises and their capacity to 
compete and develop; iii) potential slowdown in the modernisation path of the industry, as 
a by-product of the reduced competition; iv) potential loss of long term competitiveness 
and innovation capacities, as also a by-product of the reduced competition; v) impact on 
consumers prices, and in particular on low-income consumers.  
As such, efforts would be necessary to ensure that the regulated cooperation of producers 
and/or producer organisations are not based solely on achieving higher prices through 
increased bargaining power, but on incentives to optimise production costs, improve 
market transparency and production planning that together foster a more equitable 
distribution of the value-added along the supply chain and improve the producers' margins 
in an environment of high input costs.  
The objectives for improved cooperation, particularly with relation to POs and IBOs, as 
they appear in the policy option, have been defined to conform with the spirit of current 
competition rules that allow several forms of cooperation among farmers as long as they 
entail efficiency gains from consolidation of production assets, rationalisation of 
marketing activities and/or vertical integration into downstream collection and processing 
stages.  
While the impact assessment relies on recent experience and evaluations, attention will be 
given to on-going discussions and research on food supply chain issues, particularly within 
the context of the High Level Forum for a Better Functioning Food Supply Chain24 and the 
research project on the Transparency of Food Pricing (TRANSFOP)25.  
3.3. Strong focus on the market 
This option entails a minimum level of intervention with a much stronger focus on market 
forces, including the abolition of all market measures with the exception of disturbance 
clauses which could be activated in times of severe crises.  
                                                 
24  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/food/competitiveness/forum_food/index_en.htm 
25  http://www.transfop.eu/ 
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4. IMPACTS 
4.1. Simplify and streamline market intervention  
4.1.1. Economic advantages and disadvantages 
Opening public intervention purchases via tendering from the very first tonne without 
fixed prices and/or fixed quantities may create some initial uncertainty about the actual 
level of the safety net. On the other hand, removing the fixed price allows intervention to 
act only when (and at a level where) necessary, thus eluding in certain cases unnecessary 
expenditure. One of the disadvantages of the existing system is that, under a tendering 
system, operators may be willing to offer intervention products (e.g. wheat) at a lower 
value compared to the fixed intervention price and therefore reducing the level of support.  
In the beef sector private storage aid was introduced in Agenda 2000 as the main tool 
available for market support, with public intervention maintained as a safety net. Public 
intervention was last used in 2001. Since then, the EU beef market has significantly 
evolved with falling production and the EU becoming a net importer.26 The present trigger 
price for intervention is substantially below market price levels in virtually all Member 
States, thus it could be considered to abolish beef intervention. However it is not 
recommended that the basic underpinning support provided by the intervention system is 
removed for such an important EU sector.   
Making private storage aid for butter optional would allow using this instrument in duly 
justified cases at times of crises, thereby avoiding a 'regular' financing of storage costs for 
the dairy sector. While maintaining private storage without any change would be in line 
with the recommendations of the High Level Group on milk and the subsequent Council 
conclusions regarding the importance of the existing instruments to manage the dairy 
market, a disadvantage is that in normal economic circumstances the private storage aid 
finances normal storage costs for the dairy industry, thus being a windfall profit for the 
processors concerned.  
Optional private storage for SMP was suppressed in the 2007 'mini milk package'. It was 
not used since 1991 as other instruments existed (intervention, export subsidies, disposal 
measures for SMP in feed and casein). While the attractiveness of the scheme might be 
limited as the value of stored commodity would be inferior to fresh SMP and could also be 
considered as a backward step with regard to the objective of enhanced market orientation, 
the reintroduction of optional private storage could provide an alternative to public 
intervention at times of market disruption. 
Based on analysis carried out in DG AGRI27, the abolition of sugar quotas is expected to 
result in an increased EU sugar beet area, exceeding 1.8 million ha by 2020. This 
corresponds to a 12.7 % increase from 2009/10 when quotas are abolished after 2015/16 
and a slightly higher increase of 14.3 % when quotas are abolished in 2017/18, following a 
two year phasing out period. Compared to a reference scenario assuming that quotas are 
maintained over the future horizon, the sugar beet area in 2020 is only 1.9 % higher under 
the abolition scenario and 3.3 % higher under the phasing out scenario. 
                                                 
26  Although the EU became a net exporter in 2010 when considering live animal trade as well. 
27  A more detailed overview of the analysis, including methodology and results is provided in Annex IV 
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The higher level of sugar production would result in lower prices for sugar beet (and white 
sugar) when compared to the reference scenario. Prices are projected to fall below the 
current support prices for sugar beet and white sugar under each scenario, including the 
reference scenario. The effects on world prices are expected to be very limited as the price 
transmission between the EU market and the world market is rather low due to the existing 
trade regime. The impact of larger areas on sugar beet production would be 
counterbalanced by lower yields, leading to a limited increase in EU sugar beet production 
by 2020 under all scenarios (by less than 4 %). Furthermore, the increasing EU demand 
would be fulfilled by higher imports under the reference and quota abolition scenarios 
(between +10 % and 16 %) and the phasing out (+7.2 %) scenario. While remaining a net 
importer under each scenario, the net trade balance of the EU would improve with quota 
abolition compared to the reference scenario. 
The effects on the isoglucose market are projected to be small. Both production and 
domestic demand for isoglucose is expected to increase, although the higher rise in 
production would result in greater exports. 
Overall, the abolition of sugar quotas is justified on the basis of achieving a higher level of 
competitiveness as production would move to the economically most efficient areas, as 
well as the end of restricted EU exports. However, increased market orientation, including 
the abolition of private storage aid for sugar, could lead to increased co-movement (and 
hence volatility) with world market prices.  
Comparing the two quota abolition scenarios it appears that the phasing out scenario 
produces a larger impact on the EU sugar market, in terms of production increase (through 
higher areas) and consequent price decline in 2020. In the phasing-out scenario the support 
price is maintained during the transition period, resulting in a higher level of (supported) 
production in 2018. As a consequence, the restructuring and adjustment of the sector starts 
later and from a higher production base and therefore extending the life of the quota 
system through the transition period prolongs the inefficiencies of the industry and delays 
the necessary (and eventual) restructuring of the sector.   
4.1.2. Impacts on the environment 
Conclusions of a DG AGRI evaluation study28 put in evidence that until 1992 the market 
instruments maintained prices of cereals, oleaginous and protein crops at a significantly 
higher level than the world prices (increasing prices for certain crops up to 30 % above 
world prices).  
Price support influenced importantly the profitability of the crops concerned, stimulated 
producers to develop the production of these crops and to intensify their production 
methods29. Price support was not the only factor influencing intensification, but it was the 
most important.   
                                                 
28  'Evaluation de l'impact sur l'environnent des OCM et des mesures de soutien direct de la PAC relatives 
aux cultures arables', 2007. 
29  Intensification is very often negative for its impact on the environment, affecting water quality and 
quantity, biodiversity, soil status, landscape characteristics and climate change. Examples of changing 
agricultural practices were the increasing use of inputs, specialisation, monoculture, shifting from 
grassland to arable crops and concentration of specialised farms in specific areas. 
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Since 1992 the successive CAP reforms have shifted the policy instruments towards 
decoupled direct payments and reduced market measures to a safety net function in case of 
a market crisis. As world market prices are in general significantly above EU reference 
prices, market measures are only utilised in exceptional circumstances and therefore have 
a very / if any impact on production decisions.  
The streamlining and simplification of market measures maintains the safety-net role of 
market instruments and therefore their impact on production choices and as such the 
impact on the environment is considered to be neutral.  
4.1.3. WTO compliance 
In terms of the WTO classification, market measures are considered as coupled support in 
the Amber Box, the most trade distorting category of support. This support is expressed in 
terms of Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) to which under the terms of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) a global ceiling applies for each WTO 
member.  
Within the context of ongoing WTO negotiations, the current draft agricultural modalities 
negotiated in the Doha Development Round (DDA) foresee the introduction of product 
specific support caps on the basis of historical references, in addition to a reduction of the 
global ceiling.  
Amber Box support 
There are two types of Amber Box support: price gap support and direct payments to 
producers. Since in the EU most of the non-Green Box direct payments comply with 
the criteria for Blue Box classification laid down in Article 6.5. (a) URAA, most 
support in the Amber Box is, in WTO terms, provided as so called price gap support.  
This support is defined in point 8 of Annex 3 to the URAA as the difference between 
an applied administered price (AAP, in the case of the EU the intervention price) 
and a fixed external reference price (ERP, world market price) multiplied by the 
total production eligible to receive the applied administered price 
In the URAA the EU negotiated its ERPs on the basis of the 1986-1988 reference 
period and these ERPs have remained a fixed element in the price gap calculations 
ever since. The AAPs vary in function of the applicable intervention prices.  
In the absence of public intervention other support measures would be notified as direct 
payments or equivalent measurement of support (EMS); in both cases budget outlays 
would be included in the AMS calculation. Private storage would be notified as EMS.  
For the purpose of AMS calculation only price gaps for cereals, beef, butter and skimmed 
milk powder should be considered. Extending the scope for public intervention to other 
products would be to the detriment of possibilities for other coupled support and/or the EU 
negotiating stance in the DDA.  
Against this background it can be said that the implications of this option will be in broad 
terms AMS neutral and could therefore be covered in current and currently negotiated 
future WTO commitments.  
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4.1.4. Simplification and Administrative burden 
While removing the fixed price from the intervention buying-in mechanism would limit 
market intervention to the necessary cases, thus avoiding in some cases unnecessary 
expenditure, open tenders need to be run, with the corresponding administrative burden, 
even when this is not justified, e.g. when prices are above the existing intervention level. 
The additional red tape would include, for example publishing tendering regulations and 
notifications by 1 November every year. 
In the context of legislative simplification, a number of elements of the public intervention 
system and private storage aid could be transferred to delegated acts. This would concern 
elements that are not considered essential but are necessary to the proper functioning of 
the system, for example buying in periods, rules on disposals and rules on storage, or 
detailed granting conditions. 
Member States' administrations will see, on the one hand, further simplification and a 
reduction of their burden resulting from the expiry of the sugar quota. The abolition of the 
sugar quota scheme will also have a beneficial effect on sugar beet growers and – mainly - 
processors, who would no longer have to deal with the administrative issues associated 
with the management of the quota system. 
A streamlining of provisions related to intervention measures and disturbance clauses will 
render the legal framework more user-friendly and accessible. Obviously, the new 
provisions to be added should not undo the newly achieved clarity. 
From a control point of view, every market measure has an inherent risk and current policy 
instruments are generally to have ex-ante examination of all applications with a limited 
amount of ex-post controls30. The measures dealt with by Commission auditors of market 
measures are of a large number and diverse character and pursue different policy 
objectives. The different nature of measures (market stabilisation, social measures, 
emergency measures etc.) seem to limit the possibility to streamline their control.31  
                                                 
30  The Court of Auditors considers an error rate of 2 % under the ECA DAS for market measures as an 
acceptable error, which would be the acceptable level of risk. 
31  For example, while in the case of 'traditional' CAP measures (e.g. intervention storage) it is much easier 
for Member States to deal with the administrative requirements, in an emergency situation, the main 
focus would be on fighting the spread of an animal disease and this may be much more complex. In the 
case of social measures (aid for the most deprived) a lot of the work is often done by voluntary workers 
not necessarily being always well acquainted with public administration and accounting. 
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4.2. Improve the food chain functioning 
4.2.1. Economic advantages and disadvantages 
In general, the way a given supply chain is organised in terms of managing the sharing of 
risks and rewards among participants is an important determinant of the effectiveness and 
long-term viability of that supply chain. Therefore, providing incentives for participants of 
that chain to better organise themselves (while respecting competition rules) should 
improve the functioning of the supply chain as a whole. As a complement to this objective, 
farmers should be facilitated to sell their product in alternative food supply chains.32 
The economic reasoning for improving the bargaining power of farmers, their contractual 
relations and transparency along the food chain has been described in section 1.2.3. 
Accordingly, the necessity to address these issues is emphasized by the fact that the slow 
and asymmetric transmission of price changes delays necessary adjustments and prolongs 
market inefficiencies along the chain and can therefore exacerbate price volatility in 
commodity markets. Furthermore, the lack of price transparency along the food supply 
chain prevents market signals to reach economic agents in time, hampering the proper 
functioning of the market. 
An additional element behind the increasingly disproportionate distribution of value added 
along the food chain has been the increased concentration downstream the supply chain, 
particularly at the retail level. Given the generally much lower level of concentration at 
agricultural producer level, downstream players of the value chain are at a comparative 
advantage with regard to bargaining power and the possibility to substitute suppliers.  
While the main focus of the current policy options are agricultural producers, the 
assessment of the economic advantages and disadvantages of these policy options have to 
take into account the impact at the various stages of the supply chain, 'from farm to fork'.  
Since the policy options stipulate that participation to horizontal organisations will 
continue to be on a voluntary basis, and given the largely heterogeneous nature of markets 
and supply chain structures at product and Member State levels, the economic assessment 
is based on a qualitative analysis of the potential impact of the three approaches.  Special 
attention is given to the implications on competition. 
In general, based on economic literature, the economic advantages of agricultural 
cooperation would come from increased bargaining power of the participants, improved 
economies of scale in selling and purchasing, opportunity to increase added value by 
entering into other (processing) stages, as well as easier access to information. In addition, 
improved economies of scale can enable marketing through multiple channels and 
decrease risks.  
 
                                                 
32  Eurostat data (2007) for 16 Member States showed that 5.9 million holdings are operated at the semi-
subsistence level, selling surplus product primarily on local markets. Farmers’ markets and internet sales 
also provide outlets for farmers of product with specific qualities (including local origin or purchased 
directly from the producer) to avoid the constraints of the classic food supply chain. See also Annex II 
on the inter-relation of EU quality instruments and market measures as well as Annex V on short 
marketing chains.  
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Flexible cooperation 
This approach aims at encouraging the use of the wide range of possibilities farmers have 
under the current competition rules to engage in several forms of cooperation. The 
approach would include measures aimed at raising farmers' awareness of these 
possibilities, which are currently often not taken advantage of, through the launch and 
support of awareness campaigns in order to inform producers of their contractual rights, 
the exchange of best practices by notifications of current practices e.g. to an Ombudsman, 
and the support for the conception of voluntary standard contracts. 
While this approach supports pro-competitive cooperation between farmers without 
recurrence to regulatory measures and exemptions from competition rules, it is doubtful 
whether raising awareness alone could lead to a sufficient improvement in the scale and 
scope of cooperation by farmers, including joint production and marketing and/or vertical 
integration into the downstream collection and processing stages. Experience suggests that 
a number of factors determine the degree of cooperation, such as historical and cultural 
attitudes toward cooperation, farm structure, the importance of large scale retail, 
unwillingness to jeopardize existing marketing channels, etc. Some factors can be derived 
from the evaluation of the measures concerning producer organisations in the fruit and 
vegetables sector (cf. enhanced cooperation), while others from economic literature33.     
Enhanced cooperation 
This approach aims at enhancing horizontal and interbranch organisations by extending 
the scope of sectors where Member States shall recognise POs, APOs and IBOs, thus 
providing a gateway to benefit from the advantages offered by such producer cooperation.  
Evidence from the F&V sector has shown that not all POs are able to become efficient 
market participants (due to factors such as the lack of well-defined objectives, assertion of 
the individual interests instead of the common interest, lacking transparency of the 
knowledge and information among partners, etc.), but in other cases, POs and their 
associations play useful roles in concentrating supply and promoting best practice.  
Existing rules on their definiton and recognition covering certain sectors should therefore 
be  streamlined and extended to provide for recognition on request under an EU statute in 
all sectors.34 Recognised POs will then be able to benefit from additional legal certainty 
regarding their activities, specific aids (specifically regarding the fruit and vegetables, 
olive oil and table olives sectors), and, under certain conditions, the possibility for 
Member States to extend certain rules to all producers in a certain area.  
While the initiative and responsibility for collective action lies with farmers, as it should 
be, under this option the environment in which POs can blossom is strengthened. In 
addition financial support for starting a PO will be provided through the second pillar. 
 
                                                 
33  As an example see 'Stimulating cooperation among farmers in a post-socialist economy: lessons from a 
public-private marketing partnership in Poland', A. Gramzov and M. Petrick, 2007 
34  In certain sectors, where necessary, specific and/or more stringent criteria for recognition of POs may 
(continue to) apply. 
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Lessons learned from the fruit and vegetables sector 
The case of the fruit and vegetables (F&V) sector is taken as an example to examine 
the role and the impact of POs in improving the functioning of the food chain.  
In the F&V sector recognised POs are large in number (1506 in 2007) and big in 
terms of their total value of marketed production (EUR 15.5 billion in 2007). On 
average, the value of marketed production per PO in 2007 reached EUR 10.4 million 
in the EU-15 and EUR 3.9 million in the EU-10. There is a marked variation 
between Member States in terms of organisation rate: in three countries (the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland) this rate is higher than 80 % (i.e. more than 80 % 
of domestic production is marketed through POs), whilst in one group of countries it 
is lower than 15 % (most of the new Member States, Portugal, Greece and Finland). 
The rate in the remaining Member States is around 35 %.  
An evaluation study commissioned by DG AGRI and carried out by an external 
consultant covering the period 1996-2007 put in evidence factors which may 
determine the rate of organisation and highlight its main achievements. The study 
indicates that producers in very 'well-organised' regions (with a high number of 
farmers being part of a PO) are on average better paid than producers in areas where 
the rate of organisation is very low. Producers join these organisations in order to 
ensure reliable payments and the guarantee of purchase of produce, whereas the level 
of producer pricing and support services provided by POs are secondary factors.35 As 
a matter of fact, it has been observed that POs have almost no influence over the 
price of products supplied to large-scale distribution.  
Regarding the efficiency of the system, the survey indicates that the costs incurred 
(excluding salary payments) and the work-time needed in order to obtain recognition 
was acceptable for producers.  
In terms of costs, at farm level there is little evidence of collective measures to 
reduce and/or share costs, with the exception of technical advice. Most POs have 
implemented measures to improve product quality and safety (traceability systems, 
certifications required by large-scale distribution chains, etc.), with the consequent 
benefits in terms of better and more stable pricing. Even though the concentration of 
supply contributes to reinforcing the position of producers, it does so to an 
insufficient degree, taking into account the speed and size of the concentration of the 
down-stream part of the supply chain, in particular in a sector characterised by 
perishable products.  
The limited success of POs in the F&V sector is explained by the fact that in this 
sector it is easy for producers who do not belong to a PO to take advantage of their 
benefits. Other factors seem also to have played a role, for example the fact that 
public support is limited and requires equal private financing from the producers, as 
well as complexities for implementing the system. Moreover, many farmers would 
be willing to participate in 'joint activities' related to quality, environment, promotion 
                                                 
35  The study suggests also other factors in support of membership: historical and cultural factors, product 
related factors, importance of large scale retail and fiscal transparency. 
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or market information but they do not want to change their current marketing 
channels. 
The provisions aimed at improving the distribution of value added along the food chain – 
and in particular the creation of POs in all sectors – would respond to demands in 
particular from some PDO/PGI36 producer groups. This might create an additional 
incentive for farmers to participate in EU quality schemes. However, reinforcing the role 
of POs should not lead to excluding the possibility for newcomers to join the quality 
scheme and to the exclusion of small producers. It is advisable to allow IBOs (but not 
POs) the right to regulate supply as it is currently the situation in the wine sector. 
IBOs can play useful roles in allowing dialogue between actors in the supply chain, and in 
promoting best practice and market transparency. Attention would be given to avoid 
negative impacts on markets from IBO agreements and practices, such as the partitioning 
of markets, affecting the sound operation of the CMO, distorting or eliminating 
competition, entailing price fixing, or creating discrimination.   
Regulated cooperation 
This approach extends the measures suggested under the enhanced cooperation approach, 
particularly the permission of collective bargaining by POs, to include for example the 
obligation to use written contracts and derogation from the prohibition on price fixing.  
Provisions to improve the functioning of the food chain may have a positive impact on 
production planning with respect to demand, diminishing uncertainties regarding 
quantities and expected revenue. The impact of contract schemes would depend, among 
others, on the moment of conclusion of the contract, on the characteristic of the product, 
processing and marketing, how the food chain is organised (vertical integration), market 
power of the different actors, share of the internal market on global demand, net trade 
balance, and even the different application of rules among the Member States. 
On the other hand, allowing POs to enter into collective negotiations involving price-
fixing agreements on terms and conditions without appropriate safeguard clauses could 
entail a substantial reduction of competition in agricultural markets, with detrimental 
consequences on SME processors, with possible spill-over effects on consumers. The need 
for safeguard clauses are also justified within the context of the objective to improve the 
competitiveness of EU agriculture in an increasingly global market, in order to ensure that 
the CAP maintains its market-oriented approach and does not deter modernisation and 
innovation, as well as to avoid any negative consequences for consumers.  
Caution is necessary with regard to contract details, particularly regarding price 
determination. In order to avoid possible collusive behaviour, contracts should refrain 
from any type of price indicator that could interfere with freedom to agree on mechanisms 
to determine the price. As such, while the factors determining the price should be 
explicitly indicated in the contract, it would be necessary to ensure that all elements of the 
contract are freely negotiated by the parties.  
The impact on consumers is expected to arise from the aggregate effect of policy changes 
on price levels and transmission, product quality and safety. While the impact on the latter 
                                                 
36  Protected Designation of Origin/Protected Geographical Indication 
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two will depend on the objectives pursued by POs and/or IBOs, which could be beneficial 
in case the declared objective is to 'improve quality', improved cooperation is expected to 
yield benefits with regard to price transmission. Unlike the recent period, consumers 
would benefit from lower prices during times of declining agricultural commodity prices, 
although this implies the possibility of higher price volatility for consumers as well.      
As a general element with respect to all forms of cooperation, efforts would be necessary 
to ensure that the cooperation of producers are not based solely on achieving higher prices 
through increased bargaining power, that would simply be passed downward the supply 
chain most likely leading to higher consumer prices, but on incentives to optimise 
production costs, improve market transparency, and production planning that together 
foster a more equitable distribution of the value-added along the supply chain and improve 
producers' margins in an environment of high input costs. 
Specific provisions applicable to the milk and milk products sectors 
These provisions would allow POs or APOs constituted by dairy farmers to negotiate 
contract terms, including price, with a dairy processor. In order to avoid negative 
impacts on competition on the dairy market, appropriate quantitative limits would be 
applied on the scope of POs and APOs with regard to production volumes.  
As the EU dairy sector is rather heterogeneous, the impact of a uniform threshold for 
the scope of POs and APOs with regard to production volumes would have diverging 
effects within Member States. For example, in Member States with a more 
concentrated processing sector, dairy processors would have the opportunity to 
switch between different agricultural producers and/or relocate collection activities 
in other milk production areas. In effect, this would have a positive impact on 
competition and increase the pace of structural adjustment in the dairy sector with 
production moving into more productive and/or cost efficient production areas and 
products.37  On the other hand, in Member States with a less concentrated processing 
sector, increased bargaining power of producers could result in disproportionate 
distribution of value added towards farmers. Furthermore, depending on the 
concentration of the retail sector, processors might face a double margin squeeze 
from higher raw milk prices demanded by farmers and lower dairy product prices 
offered by retailers. In order to reduce the negative effects, certain levels of 
safeguard clauses appear necessary that take into account market and structural 
differences among Member States.  
                                                 
37  See also Annex II concerning PDO-PGI quality schemes. 
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4.2.2. Impacts on the environment 
The major potential impact could be delivered through IBOs and POs. The potential 
benefits from IBOs would originate from the aims for setting up this form of cooperation, 
such as: 
• Adapting production and processing, in particular with regard to quality and 
protection of the environment, jointly to the requirements of the market; 
• Providing the information and carrying out the research necessary to adjust 
production towards products more suited to market requirements and consumer 
tastes and expectations, in particular with regard to product quality and protection of 
the environment;  
• Exploiting the potential of organic farming and protecting and promoting such 
farming as well as designations of origin, quality labels and geographical 
indications; 
•  Promoting practices of integrated production or other environmentally sound 
production methods. 
These benefits would be multiple in case of extending IBOs to new sectors. 
Coordinated action between all the actors of the food chain, based on commonly agreed 
voluntary commitments, is a powerful tool to improve environmental practises. This is 
supported by similar experiences at EU level in other fields, such as the High Level Group 
on the Competitiveness of the food industry; the High Level Forum for a Better 
Functioning Food Supply Chain or the EU Platform for Action on Diet, Physical Activity 
and Health. 
Also for POs, potential benefits may arise from two of the proposed objectives that are 
specifically oriented toward environmental issues: 
• ensuring that production is planned and adjusted to demand, particularly in terms of 
quality and quantity, 
• protecting the quality of water, soil, air, habitats and landscape, favouring a 
sustainable use of water resources, preserving or improving biodiversity and 
contributing to climate change mitigation, by promoting environmentally sound 
cultivation practices, production techniques and waste management practices. 
4.2.3. WTO compliance 
The implications of this action will be in broad terms AMS neutral and could therefore be 
covered in current and currently negotiated future WTO commitments. Non-Green Box 
support to POs would be notified as direct payments to the extent that a benefit accrues to 
the producer. 
4.2.4. Simplification and Administrative burden 
New measures in relation to POs, APOs and IBOs (depending on how they are 
implemented), as well as contracting are likely to increase the administrative burden for 
Member State authorities and beneficiaries alike.  
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4.3. Strong focus on the market 
4.3.1. Economic advantages and disadvantages  
Under this option the intervention system is dismantled, only special intervention 
measures and disturbance clauses would be kept and implemented in case of severe market 
disruptions. This option would imply greater concentration of agricultural production in 
more competitive areas, with particularly favourable conditions38, including relatively 
lower production costs, and would likely lead to higher price volatility with regard to the 
other policy options.   
The recent experience during the dairy crisis has demonstrated the impact of intervention 
purchases and other market support measures in limiting the drop in market prices. The 
lack of clearly defined safety net levels could also create uncertainty among the 
participants of the supply chain with negative impacts on management decisions. In 
addition, issues related to the imperfect functioning of agricultural markets, and the 
consequences for farmers' income of an imbalanced distribution of valued added along the 
food chain, may emerge much more clearly under this option.  
4.3.2. Impacts on the environment 
Withdrawing of support would lead to greater concentration of agricultural production in 
some areas with particularly favourable conditions, using more intensive farming 
practices, while the less competitive areas would face marginalisation and land 
abandonment39. Such developments would result in increased environmental pressures and 
the deterioration of valuable habitats with serious economic and social consequences 
including an irreversible deterioration of the EU agricultural production capacity. 
4.3.3. WTO compliance 
This action would see the abolition of public intervention and therefore the corresponding 
elimination of AMS. 
4.3.4. Simplification and Administrative burden 
There would be a substantial slimming down of the legal framework, with a significant 
reduction of burden on Member State authorities. Beneficiaries are not requested to submit 
data and information, with the exception of situations of crisis. Time spent on meeting 
information obligations will be significantly reduced. On the other hand, it would also 
imply a loss of useful market information for analysis in case the current Member State 
obligations to communicate are removed. 
From a control point of view the associated risks would relate to monitoring market 
developments, administration of crisis situations and to supervise that emergency measures 
are only used when facing crisis situations and not as hidden state aids. The pure reduction 
of measures should imply for Member States reduction of administrative burden and 
simplification. 
                                                 
38  See Scenar 2020 – Prospective scenario study on agriculture and the rural world, 2006. 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/reports/scenar2020/index_en.htm .  
39 See previous footnote. 
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5. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Simplify and streamline 
existing instruments 
If a number of elements of the 
intervention system, private 
storage aid and special clauses 
are transferred to delegated 
acts, the system would be 
much more simple and easy to 
operate. 
Removing fixed prices in the 
intervention system allows 
intervention to act only when 
necessary. 
Intervention through tendering 
may lead to certain initial 
uncertainty about the actual 
level of the safety net.  
The extension of private 
storage aid to other sectors 
(SMP) may be seen as a step 
backwards in market 
orientation 
 
 Neutral impact on the environment. Farmers production choices 
today are already less influenced by market support 
Improve the food chain 
functioning 
Fostering cooperation (POs, 
APOs, IBOs): better price 
transparency, improved 
bargaining power of farmers 
and  market and income 
stability 
Optional contracts: less 
uncertainties regarding 
quantities and expected 
revenue, possible positive 
impact on price stability.  
Compulsory contracts: Positive 
impact on price stability.  
Major potential impact on the 
environment could be 
delivered through coordinated 
actions 
Effectiveness and impacts may 
vary widely, by sector and 
country.  
Determination of the 'relevant 
market' is an asset to properly 
evaluate this option. 
 
 
 
Compulsory contracts: Risk of 
distortion in competition. Risk 
to disadvantage non organised 
farmers; Risk of rigidities in 
the market 
 
Strong focus on the 
market 
Greater concentration of 
agricultural production in more 
competitive areas.  
It is not certain whether 
markets would be more stable. 
More intensive farming in 
areas with particularly 
favourable conditions. 
Marginalisation and land 
abandonment in less 
competitive areas. 
Increased environmental 
pressure, strong deterioration 
of EU production capacity. 
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ANNEX I - DETAILED OUTLINE OF CURRENT MARKET INSTRUMENTS 
The Single Common Market Organisation (sCMO)40 provides the legal framework for 
the instruments currently available with regard to the internal market, trade with third 
countries, competition rules, general and specific provisions as well as implementing, 
transitional and final rules. To facilitate the connection with the policy options discussed 
in the report, the various measures have been organised with respect to their scope, as 
follows: (internal) market management measures, border protection and food chain 
functioning. Furthermore, only measures that are pertinent to the impact assessment are 
discussed.  
Market measures 
• Private storage aid is triggered, as a general rule, at a price level which is closer to 
market prices than intervention and represents a first layer of market management. 
The aid is mandatory for butter and optional for white sugar, beef, pig meat, sheep and 
goat meat, and olive oil. It is fixed by the Commission or established through tender, 
while the triggering mechanisms are set at Commission discretion. Private storage aid 
has been granted to the pig meat sector in 2007-2008, while in other sectors the aid 
has been used only in some Member States (e.g. Spain for olive oil).  Although in 
theory private storage is the preferred market management tool to deal with temporary 
over-supply in the beef sector, in practice the current provisions on private storage aid 
have not been used.  
Table 1 – Private Storage Aid  
Product coverage Reference price Triggering mechanism Time constraints 
butter  
(mandatory) 
Aid fixed on the basis of certain 
criteria 
Storage from 1 March 
to 15 August, can be 
removed from 16 
August. Storage 
between 90 and 210 
days 
beef and veal At commission discretion when 
market prices < 103% reference 
price (2 224 €/t) 
  
pig meat At commission discretion when 
market prices < 103% reference 
price (1 509 €/t) 
minimum storage 
period of 2 months 
sheep and goat 
meat 
At commission discretion under 
difficult market situation in one or 
more of the following MS: UK, 
Northern Ireland, other Member 
States taken separately 
  
sugar At commission discretion when 
market  prices < 85%  reference 
price (404 €/t) 
 
olive oil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Storage aid pre-
fixed or established 
through tender 
 
At commission discretion when 
market prices < 1779 €/t oil virgin 
extra, 1710 €/t oil virgin, 1524 €/t oil 
lampante 
minimum storage 
period of 3 months 
                                                 
40  COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 1234/2007 of 22 October 2007 establishing a common 
organisation of agricultural markets and on specific provisions for certain agricultural products 
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• Public intervention is activated at a lower level than private storage aid, when market 
prices go below reference price levels,. Intervention buying in is foreseen for cereals, 
rice, skimmed milk powder (SMP), butter and beef. Intervention prices, triggering 
mechanisms, calendars and quantitative ceilings vary across sectors. For cereals (with 
the exception of wheat) and rice, buying-in is decided by the Commission. 
Table 2 – Public Intervention 
Product coverage Reference price Triggering mechanisms Time constraints 
Quantitative 
Ceilings with 
guaranteed 
prices  
soft wheat 101.31 €/t 
 
at fixed price up to 
3 million t,  and by 
tendering for 
quantities beyond 
3 million t 
from 1 November 
to 31 May 
 
3 million t  
 
other cereals, rice other cereals: 
101.31 €/t  
rice: 150 €/t 
Commission decision 
to extend 
quantitative ceiling 
other cereals: from 
1 November to 31 
May 
rice: from 1 April to 
31 July 
other cereals and 
rice: 0 t 
SMP 169.80 €/100 kg Full intervention 
price up to 109 000 t, 
then monthly tenders 
with no minimum 
price 
from 1 March to 31 
August 
109 000 t 
butter 246.39 €/100 kg 90 % of reference 
price up to 30 000 t, 
then monthly tenders 
with no minimum 
price 
from 1 March to 31 
August 
30 000 t 
beef   1 560 €/t Compulsory to open 
when market price at 
Member State level  
is below 1 560 €/t 
over 2 consecutive 
weeks 
    
 
• Production quotas have been an important instrument for market stabilisation, in 
sectors facing over production, notably the dairy and sugar sectors. Dairy and sugar 
quotas are set to expire following their respective 2014/15 quota year, following 
earlier decisions on the CMO in 2003 and 2004 respectively. In line with the greater 
market orientation of the CAP post-2013, the quota system cannot be seen as a 
solution to the market problems faced by these sectors today, as demonstrated during 
the run-up to and during the dairy crisis in 2009.  
• Special intervention measures and special measures in case of market disturbances can 
be implemented at Member State or regional level under specific circumstances for 
certain sectors: 
– Articles 44 to 46 Reg. 1234/2007: In case of movement restrictions due to 
measures taken to combat animal diseases for beef and veal, dairy products, pig 
meat, sheep meat and goat meat, eggs, poultry meat. For the egg and poultry 
sectors, exceptional market support measures can be taken in case of loss in 
consumer confidence. 
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– Articles 47-48 and186-187 of Reg. 1234/2007: Where prices on the Community 
market rise and/or fall significantly, the Commission may take necessary measures 
in the cereals, rice, sugar, hops, beef and veal, sheep meat and goat meat, milk and 
milk products, pig meat, eggs, poultry meat and olive oil sectors. With regard to 
the cereals, rice, sugar and dairy products the Commission may suspend import 
duties in whole or part for certain products. 
– Art 191 of Reg. 1234/2007: allows the Commission to adopt the measures which 
are both necessary and justifiable in an emergency, in order to resolve specific 
practical problems. Such measures may derogate from provisions of the sCMO, 
but only to the extent that, and for such a period, as is strictly necessary. 
• Other instruments whose main aim is not that of supporting markets could also have 
an impact on market stability. The existing food programme for the most deprived 
persons was originally designed to provide surplus (intervention) stocks of farm 
produce to needy people.41 Other programmes, like the school milk42 and school 
fruit43 schemes provide those products under certain conditions to schoolchildren.   
Border protection 
• Border protection has an important role in contributing to stabilise (domestic) 
markets. Common import tariffs apply for most agricultural products. Tariff-rate 
quotas are also used for various products. Moreover, imports can enter with lower 
tariffs or even duty and quota free under EU preferential agreements. There are 
safeguard provisions (especially additional duties) should imports reach trigger levels 
(high volumes and/or low prices).  
• As a combined result of CAP reform, WTO rules and world market developments, the 
use of export refunds has significantly decreased in terms of expenditure, quantities 
and product coverage. In 2009, export refunds accounted for just 1.4 % of EAGF 
expenditure, i.e. EUR 650 million. They have been used over some months in 2009 
for dairy products to support the market in a period of severe crisis; they continue to 
be used for poultry and some processed pig meat products. As domestic support, 
border measures are subject to WTO discipline. 
Under ongoing WTO negotiations, the EC committed itself to phase-out export 
refunds on condition of elimination of all similar measures by other developed 
countries. A successful completion of the Doha Development Round of agricultural 
trade negotiations would imply that these instruments could no longer be used in their 
current form. During exceptional circumstances of the dairy crisis in 2009 the resort to 
export subsidies allowed the relief of nearly 1.4 million tonnes of dairy products from 
the EU market. 
                                                 
41  The scheme was amended in the mid-1990s to make it possible to supplement intervention stocks with 
market purchases in certain circumstances. The resources available for the scheme have been 
increased as from the 2009 budget, and the Commission has tabled a proposal to the Council to 
modify the system (e.g. introducing co-financing). To be noted that Germany, United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands do not implement the scheme. 
42  http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/milk/schoolmilk/index_en.htm  
43  http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/markets/fruitveg/sfs/index_en.htm 
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Food chain functioning 
• As regards the food chain functioning, the sCMO is the legal base for recognition by 
Member States of producer organisations (POs) in certain sectors, where they have a 
specific role in EU law. Otherwise Member States may do so on either a national or 
EU statute.  
The scope of the sCMO with regard to POs covers the fruit and vegetables (F&V), 
olive oil, hops, wine, silkworm and tobacco sectors, although with different objectives 
and means. Current aim of POs in the F&V sector is to ensure that production is 
planned and adjusted to demand, both in terms of quality and quantity; to concentrate 
supply and to place products produced by its members in the market, and to optimise 
production costs and stabilise producer prices. Each PO has to market the production 
of its members and could manage one or more of those actions.  
Specific rules exist for association and recognition of POs and associations of 
producer organisations (APOs) in the F&V sector. It has to be noted that recognition – 
of either POs or APOs - is merely an 'entrance requirement', and not a support 
measure in itself. 
EU funds to POs in the F&V sector are provided in the form of contribution to the 
creation of operational funds, co-financed in most cases at 50 % and limited to 4.1 % 
of the value of marketed production. 
Support is currently available under rural development to foster the setting up and the 
administrative operation of producers groups (PGs)44 in EU-12 Member States. A 
proposal to extend this support to EU-15 Member States has been submitted to the 
Council and the European Parliament as part of the Lisbon alignment of the Rural 
Development Regulation. 
Interbranch organisations (IBOs): Member States shall recognise IBO organisations in 
the F&V, olive oil and table olives and tobacco sectors. The disciplines decided by the 
IBO members are only effective for the members of the IBO. For example, when the 
French F&V IBO decides quality rules for apples, they do not apply to apples 
produced in other Member States or third countries. The possibility to extend certain 
rules issued by an IBO to national non-member producers are however possible in the 
F&V sector. As for POs and APOs, recognition is a merely 'entrance requirement', and 
not a support measure in itself. 
 
                                                 
44  Producer Groups are defined as farmers organisations that have not yet achieved the status of 
recognised Producer Organisations 
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ANNEX II -  INTER-RELATION OF EU QUALITY INSTRUMENTS AND MARKET MEASURES 
The EU safeguards food quality in many ways, for example via measures to enhance 
food safety and hygiene, clear labelling rules, regulations on animal and plant health and 
animal welfare, control of pesticide residues and additives in food and via nutritional 
information. Beyond these ‘baseline’ requirements, farmers and food producers use their 
expertise and imagination to give their products other, individual qualities valued by 
consumers. 
EU quality instruments 
Marketing standards45: The European marketing standards encourage EU farmers to 
produce products of given quality, in conformity with the consumers' expectations. They 
allow a comparison of prices between various qualities of the same product, ensure 
minimum quality for the consumer, and facilitate the operation of the internal market and 
the international trade. They replace the various national standards and are regulated by 
the 'single CMO'. They assure stability to the market, in certain cases they are based on 
international standards, in order to assure a smooth functioning of the market. All these 
rules require basic requirements, and should not depend on the market situation. Market 
stability is an important issue for quality, as producers tend to reduce production costs 
and consequently the quality when prices fall. Nevertheless, producers have to respect 
the compulsory EU standards, which guarantee that a basic quality standard is respected. 
Certification schemes: In addition to marketing standards, EU quality schemes46 (PDO-
PGI47, TSG48 and Organic Framing) identify products and foodstuffs produced according 
to exact specifications, alongside an increasing number of public and private certification 
schemes increasingly used by retailers and farming groups. These schemes offer 
guarantees for consumers about origin and/or methods of production, deliver effective 
marketing messages about high value-added products, and underpin rural businesses 
producing quality products. For products obtained under a certification scheme, 
producers have to respect fixed specifications detailing farming methods and production 
techniques. As a result, price volatility has a limited impact on the quality of the product, 
although volatility will impact producer returns. However, evidence shows that prices for 
specific quality products can hold up even when commodity prices fall. 
                                                 
45  A proposal to modify Regulation (EC) 1234/07 has been recently presented (COM(2010) 738 final) in 
the context of the 'Quality package,' taking into account the new rules of the Lisbon Treaty, which will 
give to the Commission the responsibility to adopt, by delegated acts, any modification to existing 
marketing standards, including the mandatory indication of the place of farming. This would allow 
harmonizing and simplifying the rules. 
46  The Commission adopted on 10 December 2010 a proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Regulation on agricultural product quality schemes (COM(2010) 733 final). This proposal modifies 
the existing legislations on PDO-PGI and TSG and proposes to empower the Commission to adopt 
new optional quality terms by delegated acts. 
47  Protected Designations of Origin and Protected Geographical Indications according to Regulation 
(EC) N°510/2006 
48  Traditional Specialities Guaranteed according to Regulation (EC) N°509/2006 
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Impact of market measures on the quality of production 
Market measures that intervene directly in the market (private storage aid, public 
intervention, special intervention measures in case of market disturbances and export 
refunds) can affect production decisions and product quality: 
– Market instruments normally specify the standard or quality of product that is 
eligible for the intervention measure (e.g. minimum carcass classification or age 
at slaughter for meat) or provide different intervention prices for different 
qualities of product (e.g. virgin and non-virgin oils). These specifications will 
determine the impact of the market measure on the specific quality of product.  
– If the market instrument (such as intervention buying) is too attractive to 
producers, there is a risk of production 'for intervention' rather than 'for the 
market'. The result will be that the signal to producers concerning the quality of 
product will be set by the intervention specification, and tend to shift production 
quality in general to this minimum level. Producers of high-value added quality 
may not be affected provided the market continues to give a high-enough margin 
for the specific product. However, producers of 'medium' quality, slightly above 
the minimum standard set in the intervention specification, will have an incentive 
to lower quality to only the basic standard.  
– If market measures are designed to affect production, they could reduce the 
incentive for farmers to participate in quality measures. However, if market 
instruments are generally unattractive to producers (which is the case under 
normal market conditions), production standards are determined by consumers' 
preferences and specifications, and not by intervention standards.  
– If there are no market instruments or if they are ineffective in stabilising the 
market, then producers risk facing volatility in the market. For producers of 
value-added product or niche product, volatility in commodity prices may 
present an advantage – provided demand for their value-added product holds up. 
However, a severe price fall in a sector will drag down all prices, as consumers 
will be incentivised to switch to bulk products (with inferior quality and lower 
value) as the price gap increases. A producer of value-added products who has 
high production costs might therefore find that a sectoral price-fall pushes the 
return for the value-added product below costs of production, creating incentives 
to scale back production costs by lowering production quantities or product 
qualities. 
– The optimum environment from the perspective of quality policy is that 
producers can respond to market demand, both for standard product and for high 
value added product. This requires a stable market environment but where 
market messages are not obscured.  
Production quotas can also influence quality policy by obscuring market messages and 
also by limiting the offer. Quotas may limit normal market incentives to innovate, to 
improve quality and meet buyer specifications, and control costs. However, in cases 
where producers are producing value-added product, quotas can operate to limit supply 
and hold up prices. In the dairy sector, production quotas have been instrumental in 
controlling volume output for producers of high value-adding product, notably PDO 
cheeses and organic dairy products. In PDO–PGI zones of production that are under-
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capacity, abolition of quotas could have the result that production of milk eligible for 
processing as a PDO product would increase.  
The possibility to limit output of processed products (e.g. through an agreement of 
cheese producers of a cheese benefiting from GI protection) can have a direct impact on 
farmers trying to sell their raw material. If one wants to maximise sales opportunities for 
e.g. dairy farmers to sell their milk into higher-value-added production streams like 
quality cheese as compared to bulk products, output limitations for quality cheeses could 
be counter productive. 
Such output limitations could furthermore reduce the incentive for young farmers to get 
started, as sales opportunities decrease. 
Output limitations may also have an impact on the value of investments undertaken in 
the past (including investments co-financed by EU funds). For example, output 
limitations may reduce the possibility to fully use cheese making machinery. Output 
limitations may also reduce the incentive for farmers or processors to invest. 
Further analysis is necessary to assess the potential impact of additional possibilities for 
producer organisations to limit output on the principle that everyone should be free to 
enter the market for producing a product bearing a geographical indication. 
Producer organisations (PO) and other forms of collective arrangements can be formed 
around a specific quality of production. Certain POs have been asking for the possibility 
to control production themselves. This is in particular important in the milk sector, where 
the part of PDO/PGI products is quite relevant (8 % of the production) and the quota 
system is set to expire in 2015. Such arrangements are common in the area of PDO-PGI 
and TSGs, as well as regional initiatives to deliver certain qualities or attributes of 
products. The impact of POs on quality of production will depend on the role and powers 
invested in the organisation, the scale of participation, but also whether the PO has power 
to apply its decisions to non-participating members. A PO might also set the production 
standard or quality – in particular when developing the specifications – and conditions 
for marketing products.  
Quality can offer farmers a protection against market volatility and prices drops (see the 
example of Jámon Serrano – Annex III of Impact assessment on Traditional Specialities 
Guaranteed49). A limited capacity of market measures to compensate for market volatility 
and with market management capacities granted to POs, it can be expected that quality 
schemes would become very appealing for those producers who are in a position to meet 
the specifications and join a scheme.  
Certain risks have to be highlighted, such as the risk that the rules benefit producers at 
the expense of consumers, or benefit one class of producers (for example the larger 
operators having more influence in the organisation) at the expense of others (e.g. 
smaller ones). Rules might also prevent innovation or marketing of product that has a 
greater value-added than the standard set by the PO. 
                                                 
49  http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/policy/quality-package-2010/ia-tsg_en.pdf 
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ANNEX III - DIFFERENCES IN COMPETITIVENESS ACROSS MEMBER STATES 
Calculations using Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) data highlight differences 
in competitiveness between Member States in the dairy, wheat and beef sectors by 
comparing operating costs and total receipts with relation to intervention prices. As can 
be seen the situation varies widely across sectors and Member States. The methodology 
for calculating these indicators is as follows50: 
• Receipts take into account: the value of sales of products, coupled payments, and 
possible national payments51.  
• Operating costs include specific costs, e.g. purchased inputs as well as inputs 
produced and used on the farm, other specific costs, water; and non specific operating 
costs, e.g. contract work (machinery hire), current upkeep of machinery and 
equipment, motor fuels and lubricants, car expenses, upkeep of land improvements 
and buildings, electricity, heating fuels, insurance, taxes and other dues, other farming 
overheads. Other costs, like depreciation, remuneration to external and family labour, 
are not included. 
• Intervention price based on the fat and protein values of raw milk derived from the 
intervention buying-in prices (at guaranteed levels) of butter and SMP and taking into 
account the real fat content of milk in each Member State.  
In the dairy sector the operating costs are higher than the equivalent intervention price in 
nine Member States, with the greatest differences to be found in Finland, Greece, Malta, 
and Sweden (Figure 5). At the same time, average total receipts, including coupled 
payments and national aids (available for few Member States) are above costs in all 
Member States. Data has to be analysed with caution because operating costs are being 
compared with an 'equivalent' intervention price calculated on the basis of intervention 
prices for SMP and butter, not taking into account the production mix of Member States. 
For wheat specialised farms, it comes out that in the wheat sector the intervention price 
seems to be set at an adequate safety-net level (Figure 6). In Bulgaria, Spain, Romania, 
Lithuania and Belgium operating costs are slightly below the intervention price but in all 
cases margins are positive thanks to higher receipts. The only Member State with a 
negative margin seems to be the Slovak Republic, where operating costs are higher than 
the receipts. 
The same simulations made for farm specialised in feed cereals (barley and maize) 
confirm that the intervention price level is adequate. The only exception is given by 
Germany, which shows a relative competitive disadvantage in the production of maize 
                                                 
50  Years 2008 and 2009 are estimated on the basis of 2007 FADN data. The output, operating costs and 
gross margin (over operating costs) for 2008 and 2009 are estimated on the basis of output and input 
price indices. The structures are supposed to remain identical. 
51  In the case of dairy farms this includes the EU dairy payments until its decoupling and Article 69 
payments for dairy (used in Spain). The value of the calves and that of the sales of cull dairy cows are 
not taken into account, because no satisfactory method has been found to estimate them on the basis of 
the current data. 
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and barley, given that margins appear to be negative in the period examined. Indeed, in 
this country prices are very low and stocks of barley have been accumulating during 
recent years; intervention was activated until the start of Health Check implementation 
(July 2009), which established zero ceilings for feed cereals. 
Finally, simulations made using data from breeders and fatteners specialized farms 
(Figure 9) put in evidence that operating costs vary significantly between Member States. 
As a general pattern, the costs are well reflected in beef market prices. In Spain and Italy, 
beef prices seem relatively more profitable52. Operating costs are higher than the level of 
intervention in all Member States with the exception of Portugal. 
Figure 5 - Milk specialised farms - estimates 2006-09
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Figure 6 - Wheat specialised farms - estimates 2006-2009
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52  The results for Italy, where prices of cattle sold in the FADN sample are much higher than the 
representative prices of A R3 bulls, may require further investigation. 
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Figure 7 - Barley specialised farms - estimates 2006-2009
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Figure 8 - Maize specialised farms - estimates 2006-2009
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Figure 9 - Breeders-Fatteners specialised farms - estimates 2006-2009
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ANNEX IV – SUGAR MARKET OPTIONS WITH AGLINK-COSIMO 
A quantitative analysis has been carried out in DG AGRI in order to measure the likely 
impact of sugar quota abolition, based on two distinctive scenarios. This annex provides 
an overview of the methodology, scenarios, main findings and the essential results. 
Methodology 
The model used for this exercise has been the AGLINK-COSIMO model in the version 
2010 including the updates made to the EU and macro-economic data as used for the 
Prospects for Agricultural Markets and Income in the EU 2010-2020. In addition, 
consumer prices and a food demand system have been introduced in the general model 
update. This will be included in the AGLINK-COSIMO model 2011. The sugar module 
of the EU has been revised to be comparable to the rest of the markets. The model works 
on production seasons, which in the case of EU sugar is from October to September. 
Some of the changes include: 
– Planting decision for sugar beet depend on development of average sugar beet prices, 
production costs and the relation between return per hectare for out-of quota 
production to other crop returns, 
– Out-of quota production is possible destined for exports and processing mainly 
ethanol, 
– Prices for out-of quota sugar beet are determined by export prices for white sugar and 
the domestic sugar price in the relation of shares of use, 
– Sugar imports are determined by quotas for the Balkan countries and for other 
countries (CXL), for the imports from EBA and EPA (former ACP) there is only a 
theoretical limit and they react to the price difference between the EU and world 
market, 
– In the case of an effective support price, exports are limited by WTO limits, 
– Isoglucose production is constrained by the production quota, 
– Tariffs for molasses and isoglucose are introduced in the import equations of these 
products. 
Scenarios 
– The quota scenario assumes the continuation of the current quota scheme for sugar 
and isoglucose as well as support prices for white sugar and sugar beet; 
– The no-quota scenario assumes that quotas and support prices are abolished as of 
2016/1753; 
                                                 
53  From a modelling point of view, given the delay of the planting decision, the abolition of quotas is 
technically introduced in the preceding quota year 
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– The landing scenario assumes that quotas and support prices are abolished as of 
2018/19, following a two year transition period when quotas are increased by 3 % per 
year, while maintaining the support prices; 
– A sensitivity analysis has been conducted on these scenarios, assuming fixed world 
market prices at 250 €/t for white sugar and no feedback from the world market; 
– The reduced import scenario assumes a stronger reaction of EBA and EPA sugar 
exports to the EU towards the price difference between the EU and the world market 
prices.  
Main findings 
• The abolition of quotas is expected to result in an increase (1.9% in 2020) in sugar 
beet area in the EU. On the one hand, there will be no restriction due to the quota but 
on the other hand it is expected that the average producer price for sugar beet will fall. 
• The prices for sugar beet (-8.2% in 2020) and white sugar (-3.5% in 2020) are 
considerably below the current support prices. This limits the expansion of the 
domestic sugar production and sugar import expansion and at the same time increases 
the demand for sugar especially from the biofuel industry (7.6%). 
• The effects on world prices are expected to be limited (-0.2% for the world white 
sugar price) as the price transmission between the EU market and the world market is 
low due to the trade regime. 
• The effects on the isoglucose market are small because of limited changes in the 
sugar market. The domestic demand for isoglucose is expected to increase slightly 
(1.5% in 2020) and the exports to increase (4.1% in 2020), resulting in a rise in 
production (2.3% in 2020). 
• The effects in the landing scenario for the season 2020/21 are due to the later abolition 
of the quota and the shorter time to adjust to the new market conditions. In the case of 
sugar beet production the expansion of the quota including maintaining the support 
price for three more seasons results in a higher starting base and consequently larger 
production increase.  
• The modelling approach chosen does not allow distinguishing regional effects which 
might result in different pictures. 
• The effect of the abolition of quotas depends to an extent to the application of support 
prices. In the results presented here it is assumed that support prices will not be in use 
after the abolition of the quota. Otherwise the production increase of EU sugar would 
become much more pronounced. 
• A low world market price (250 €/t of white sugar) alters the situation and results in a 
slight decline of the sugar beet production in the EU (-3.4%), as the presence of the 
support price secures the full use of the quota otherwise. 
• If developing countries (EBA and EPA) react stronger to the difference between 
the EU and world market price, a further expansion by 2.4% of the EU sugar 
production can be expected due to lower exports from EBA and EPA to the EU. 
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Results for selected variables from the different scenarios using AGLINK-COSIMO 
 
     quota no-quota landing  change to quota  change to 2009/10 
  
2009/1
0 
2014/1
5 
2020/2
1 2020/21 
2020/2
1   no-quota landing   quota no-quota landing 
Sugar beet area ('000 ha) 1601 1717 1772 1805 1831 1.9% 3.3% 10.6% 12.7% 14.3% 
Sugar beet yield (t/ha) 71 65 65 65 65 -0.2% -0.1% -9.1% -9.2% -9.2% 
Sugar beet production ('000 t) 114235 110799 114942 116888 118649 1.7% 3.2% 0.6% 2.3% 3.9% 
Sugar beet price (€/t) 29.2 25.5 25.6 23.5 23.0 -8.2% -10.0% -12.6% -19.8% -21.3% 
..Sugar beet out-of quota price (€/t) 29.2 22.4 23.2 23.5 23.0 1.0% -1.0% -20.6% -19.8% -21.3% 
..Sugar beet support price (€/t) 26.3 26.3 26.3  -100.0% -100.0% 0.0% -100.0% -100.0% 
Sugar beet value of production (mill. €) 3159 2663 2768 2583 2571 -6.7% -7.1% -12.4% -18.2% -18.6% 
Sugar production ('000 t) 17468 16841 17471 17767 18035 1.7% 3.2% 0.0% 1.7% 3.2% 
..Sugar out-of quota production ('000 t) 4131 3505 4134 17767 18035 329.7% 336.2% 0.1% 330.1% 336.6% 
Sugar total use ('000 t) 18330 18718 19615 19967 20013 1.8% 2.0% 7.0% 8.9% 9.2% 
..Sugar food and industry use ('000 t) 15674 15344 15503 15542 15578 0.3% 0.5% -1.1% -0.8% -0.6% 
..Sugar use for biofuels ('000 t) 2656 3374 4113 4425 4435 7.6% 7.8% 54.8% 66.6% 67.0% 
Sugar exports ('000 t) 3063 1322 1105 1181 1232 6.9% 11.5% -63.9% -61.4% -59.8% 
Sugar imports ('000 t) 3187 3250 3696 3520 3416 -4.7% -7.6% 16.0% 10.4% 7.2% 
..Sugar imports, EBA & EPA ('000 t) 2177 2240 2686 2510 2406 -6.5% -10.4% 23.4% 15.3% 10.5% 
..Share of white sugar in total imports 0.23 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.1% 0.3% -1.7% -1.5% -1.3% 
Sugar total stocks ('000 t) 3874 3694 4219 3234 3279 -23.3% -22.3% 8.9% -16.5% -15.4% 
White sugar producer price (€/t) 482 405 403 389 380 -3.5% -5.7% -16.5% -19.4% -21.2% 
..White sugar support price (€/t) 404 404 404  -100.0% -100.0% 0.0% -100.0% -100.0% 
White sugar world price (€/t) 450 292 313 312 312 -0.2% -0.3% -30.5% -30.6% -30.7% 
Isoglucose production ('000 t) 690 690 690 706 702 2.3% 1.6% 0.0% 2.3% 1.6% 
Isoglucose use ('000 t) 575 562 495 502 496 1.5% 0.3% -13.9% -12.7% -13.7% 
Isoglucose exports ('000 t) 119 136 203 212 213 4.1% 4.6% 70.3% 77.3% 78.2% 
Isoglucose imports ('000 t) 4 8 8 7 7 -4.6% -5.2% 101.3% 92.2% 91.0% 
Isoglucose net trade ('000 t) 116 128 196 204 205 4.5% 5.0% 69.3% 76.9% 77.7% 
Isoglucose producer price (€/t) 358 322 302 287 285 -4.9% -5.6% -15.7% -19.9% -20.4% 
Isoglucose world price (€/t) 325 251 280 277 277 -1.0% -1.2% -13.9% -14.8% -15.0% 
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Results for selected variables from the different scenarios using AGLINK-COSIMO with a fixed world sugar price 
 
     quota no-quota landing  change to quota  change to 2009/10 
  
2009/1
0 
2014/1
5 
2020/2
1 2020/21 
2020/2
1   no-quota landing  quota no-quota landing 
Sugar beet area ('000 ha) 1601 1632 1742 1683 1703 -3.4% -2.3% 8.8% 5.1% 6.3% 
Sugar beet yield (t/ha) 71 65 65 65 65 -0.4% -0.4% -9.1% -9.5% -9.4% 
Sugar beet production ('000 t) 114235 105292 113034 108665 110035 -3.9% -2.7% -1.1% -4.9% -3.7% 
Sugar beet price (€/t) 29.2 25.5 25.5 23.1 22.8 -9.6% -10.8% -12.7% -21.0% -22.1% 
..Sugar beet out-of quota price (€/t) 29.2 21.6 22.9 23.1 22.8 0.8% -0.6% -21.6% -21.0% -22.1% 
..Sugar beet support price (€/t) 26.3 26.3 26.3   -100.0% -100.0% 0.0% -100.0% -100.0% 
Sugar beet value of production (mill. €) 3340 2686 2886 2509 2506  -13.1% -13.2%  -13.6% -24.9% -25.0% 
Sugar production ('000 t) 17468 16004 17181 16517 16725 -3.9% -2.7% -1.6% -5.4% -4.2% 
..Sugar out-of quota production ('000 t) 4131 2668 3844 16517 16725 329.6% 335.1% -6.9% 299.8% 304.9% 
Sugar total use ('000 t) 18330 18733 20061 20537 20566 2.4% 2.5% 9.4% 12.0% 12.2% 
..Sugar food and industry use ('000 t) 15674 15367 15512 15574 15600 0.4% 0.6% -1.0% -0.6% -0.5% 
..Sugar use for biofuels ('000 t) 2656 3365 4550 4963 4966 9.1% 9.2% 71.3% 86.8% 87.0% 
Sugar exports ('000 t) 3063 1028 721 794 819 10.2% 13.7% -76.5% -74.1% -73.2% 
Sugar imports ('000 t) 3187 3898 5148 4761 4642 -7.5% -9.8% 61.5% 49.4% 45.7% 
..Sugar imports, EBA & EPA ('000 t) 2177 2888 4138 3751 3632 -9.4% -12.2% 90.0% 72.3% 66.8% 
..Share of white sugar in total imports 0.23 0.19 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.0% 0.0% 4.2% 4.2% 4.2% 
Sugar total stocks ('000 t) 3874 3704 7483 3145 3178 -58.0% -57.5% 93.1% -18.8% -18.0% 
White sugar producer price (€/t) 482 404 400 381 375 -4.8% -6.3% -17.1% -21.1% -22.4% 
..White sugar support price (€/t) 404 404 404  -100.0% -100.0% 0.0% -100.0% -100.0% 
White sugar world price (€/t) 450 256 250 250 250  0.0% 0.0%  -44.5% -44.5% -44.5% 
Isoglucose production ('000 t) 690 690 688 701 696 1.9% 1.1% -0.4% 1.5% 0.8% 
Isoglucose use ('000 t) 575 543 496 498 493 0.4% -0.6% -13.7% -13.3% -14.2% 
Isoglucose exports ('000 t) 119 155 199 210 210 5.1% 5.3% 67.0% 75.6% 75.8% 
Isoglucose imports ('000 t) 4 8 8 7 7 -4.9% -5.0% 101.3% 91.5% 91.2% 
Isoglucose net trade ('000 t) 116 147 192 202 203 5.5% 5.7% 65.9% 75.1% 75.3% 
Isoglucose producer price (€/t) 358 335 298 284 283 -4.9% -5.0% -16.7% -20.7% -20.9% 
Isoglucose world price (€/t) 325 298 272 272 272 0.0% 0.0% -16.5% -16.5% -16.5% 
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Results for selected variables for import scenarios using AGLINK-COSIMO  
 
    no-quota red. import   no-quota red. import   change to no-quota 
   
2009/1
0 2014/15 2014/15  2020/21 2020/21  2014/15 2020/21
Sugar beet area ('000 ha)  1601 1717 1711   1805 1848   -0.3% 2.4%
Sugar beet yield (t/ha)  71 65 65   65 65   0.0% 0.1%
Sugar beet production ('000 t)  114235 110799 110415   116888 119778   -0.3% 2.5%
Sugar beet price (€/t)  29.2 25.5 25.6   23.5 24.3   0.5% 3.8%
..Sugar beet out-of quota price (€/t)  29.2 22.4 23.0       2.7%   
..Sugar beet support price (€/t)  26.3 26.3 26.3       0.0%   
Sugar beet value of production (mill. €)  3159 2663 2668   2583 2747   0.2% 6.3%
Sugar production ('000 t)  17468 16841 16783   17767 18206   -0.3% 2.5%
..Sugar out-of quota production ('000 t)  4131 3505 3446       -1.7%   
Sugar total use ('000 t)  18330 18718 18665   19967 19801   -0.3% -0.8%
..Sugar food and industry use ('000 t)  15674 15344 15295   15542 15472   -0.3% -0.4%
..Sugar use for biofuels ('000 t)  2656 3374 3370   4425 4329   -0.1% -2.2%
Sugar exports ('000 t)  3063 1322 1240   1181 1074   -6.2% -9.1%
Sugar imports ('000 t)  3187 3250 3065   3520 2812   -5.7% -20.1%
..Sugar imports, EBA & EPA ('000 t)  2177 2240 2055   2510 1802   -8.3% -28.2%
Sugar total stocks ('000 t)  3874 3694 3640   3234 3228   -1.5% -0.2%
White sugar producer price (€/t)  482 405 420   389 407   3.5% 4.7%
..White sugar support price (€/t)  404 404 404       0.0%   
White sugar world price (€/t)  450 292 293   312 312   0.2% -0.2%
Isoglucose production ('000 t)  690 690 690   706 711   0.0% 0.7%
Isoglucose use ('000 t)  575 562 565   502 511   0.6% 1.8%
Isoglucose exports ('000 t)  119 136 133   212 207   -2.3% -2.0%
Isoglucose imports ('000 t)  4 8 8   7 7   2.4% 2.0%
Isoglucose producer price (€/t)  358 322 330   287 293   2.5% 2.0%
Isoglucose world price (€/t)  325 251 252   277 277   0.1% -0.1%
 
Note: The scenario (red. import) assumes a stronger reaction of EBA and EPA sugar imports to the EU towards the price differential between the EU 
price and the world market price. 
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 ANNEX V - SHORT MARKETING CHAINS  
Short marketing chains are those which avoid the food supply chain, either by direct 
sales from producer to consumer or sales via one intermediary acting on behalf of the 
farmers/producers. Many of these sales also take place over a short distance and could be 
considered ‘local’ sales, but this is not necessarily the case especially with the growth of 
internet sales directly from the farmer. 
For many farmers, and in particular small-scale producers, supplying the main 
commercial commodity markets is particularly difficult and unrewarding, due to the 
pressures of commodity markets and dysfunction of the food supply chain discussed 
supra. A growing number of farmers are prepared to engage in short-chain marketing, in 
order to provide continuity for their economic activity and sufficient income.54  
The issue has attracted the attention of the European Parliament; in 'Fair revenues for 
farmers: A better functioning food supply'55 calls on the Commission to 'propose the 
adoption of instruments to support and promote farmer-managed food supply chains, 
short supply chains and farmers' markets, in order to establish a direct relationship with 
consumers and to enable farmers to obtain a fairer share of the value of the final sale 
price by reducing the number of middlemen and of the stages of the process'. 
Small-scale farmers have a relatively significant role with regard to the environment, 
local economy and social cohesion. According to the 2007 Eurostat Farm Structure 
Survey, 6.4 million out of the 13.7 million agricultural holdings operating in the 
European Union (i.e. 46.6 %) had an economic size of less than 1 ESU56. These holdings 
employ 23 % of total labour force in agricultural sector.  
Close to 40 % of the persons working in the European agricultural holdings work in a 
farm with less than 1 ESU, which in absolute numbers corresponds to over 10 million 
people. 4.7 million (34.5 %) of European agricultural holdings have a size from 1 to less 
than 8 ESU and represent 34 % of agricultural labour force. Agricultural patterns 
characterised by small farm structures are more present in the EU-12 Member States 
where 95.5 % of all agricultural holdings are smaller than 8 ESU, employing 81.5 % of 
agricultural labour force.  
Few marketing channels are open to small-scale farmers, whose marketing is hampered 
by the nature of the production (non-standardised product), processing and storage 
limitations, lack of infrastructure and access to markets. Their small quantities of 
production are also not sufficiently interesting to the main buyers (traders, processing 
companies and/or retailers) that increasingly dominate the marketplace.  
                                                 
54 H. Renting, T.K. Marsden, J. Banks: Understanding alternative food networks: exploring the role of 
short food supply chains in rural development, Environment and Planning A 2003, volume 35 
55 P7_TA(2010)0302 
56  ‘European Size Unit’ is a standard gross margin of 1.200 EUR that is used to express the economic 
size of an agricultural holding. This corresponds to approximately 1.3 ha of cereals or one dairy cow 
or 25 sheep or an equivalent combination of these. 
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Small-scale farmers do have some advantages of their production: artisan - instead of 
highly industrialised - production methods, the use of traditional techniques, the 
opportunity for purchasing from local producers, are all attractive ‘selling points’ or 
‘qualities’ to a segment of consumers. For both small-scale and larger producers, direct 
sales appeal to a certain group of consumers for various reasons: (perceived) reduction in 
transport distances and therefore better respect of nature and environment; local sourcing 
to support the local economy; reconnecting consumers with farmers; and ensuring that a 
higher margin goes to the farmer. Opportunities for deliveries through short marketing 
chains are also created through internet sales. 
Given the advantages of direct sales and the problems in the functioning of the food 
supply chain, especially for small-scale producers57, this form of marketing should be 
encouraged, while recognising the role of conventional channels. The objectives of 
encouraging participation in short marketing chains are: 
• Strengthen farmers' possibilities of marketing their agricultural products and 
foodstuffs through short marketing chains and of communicating the attributes of the 
product to consumers, in order to increase their returns from the market. 
• Increase consumers' knowledge about the characteristics and attributes of agricultural 
products and foodstuffs sold through short marketing chains. 
With a view to further strengthening farmers' possibilities to place their produce on the 
market and to ensure adequate consumers' information about this produce, options for 
action range from increasing visibility of existing short marketing chain schemes to 
promotion of short marketing chains through rural development measures, to 
development of labelling schemes.  
The following possibilities, which do not exclude each other, have been looked at: 
Promotion of short marketing chains through rural development support 
Member States already assist economic operators at national and/or regional level to 
place their products on the market via short marketing chains, notably through EU rural 
development support. These incentives aim at improving the marketing in rural areas of 
products produced on the farm and by the farmer and sold through short marketing 
chains. Providing tools for rural development at EU level has been confirmed at creating 
additional value as compared to action at purely national level.  
Currently, the EU rural development policy provides for several measures, including 
LEADER, that can be used to establish and foster short marketing chains by responding 
to different needs. This issue is more fully explored in the whole context of rural 
development in Annex 4 on Rural Development. However, while rural development 
measures can provide key financing, they do not in and of themselves differentiate 
product in the marketplace. In this respect the current EU rural development 'toolbox' for 
supporting short marketing chains may not fully realise its potential. For this a specific 
labelling tool is needed. 
                                                 
57  In adopting the Quality Package on 10.12.2010, the Commission noted the particular difficulties for 
small farmers to participate in EU quality schemes, and undertook further analysis. 
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Labelling scheme for short marketing chains 
Existing EU quality schemes (organic, geographical indications and traditional 
specialities) have clearly proven the usefulness of action at EU level. The scheme for 
geographical indications is even an exclusive one preventing Member States to maintain 
national system, despite the fact that many products under such schemes are not sold 
outside the region of origin.  However, none of these schemes specifically target direct 
marketing. Yet, these kinds of quality products are frequently sold through direct 
mechanisms – as the growth of the ‘organic box’, farmers’ markets selling PDO-PGI 
product, and internet sales of wine direct from producers, testify.  
At the same time, as noted in the 2010 Impact Assessment for geographical indications58, 
the geographical indications scheme is less attractive to small and semi-subsistence 
producers owing to the constraints of adhering to a specification and costs of 
certification; similar considerations are likely to apply in the case of the compliance 
burden for organic certification.  
Similarly, very small farmers may not be able to participate in investment related rural 
development measures or other rural development tools. While some Member States or 
regions are providing support for short marketing schemes, others do not. Farmers in the 
latter countries are thus put at a disadvantage. In Member States where tools exist, 
fragmentation of the approach can make cost-effective promotion campaigns more 
difficult and/or costly. Furthermore, publicly financed 'buy local' campaigns may easily 
run foul of EU internal market rules. 
The creation of a specific labelling scheme at the EU level59 is another possibility to 
assist producers who market their products through short marketing chains, and in 
particular in Member States where such tools are not yet available. Such a labelling 
scheme could be established in two ways: 
• eligibility conditions for participating in the labelling scheme are left to the 
responsibility of the Members States according to the subsidiarity principle. Only the 
definition of eligible types of marketing ('short marketing chains') is regulated at EU 
level.  
• not only the eligible types of marketing are defined at EU level but also other criteria 
such as eligibility requirements for economic operators and control mechanisms.  
The advantages and disadvantages of an EU scheme are summarised in the table below. 
Advantages 
• More structured communication enhanced by an EU 
scheme should allow to better inform European 
consumers about a part of the reality of agriculture that 
is not always easily visible to them.  
• An EU scheme should allow to complement and thus 
Disadvantages 
• Member States that will be responsible to 
enforce the EU scheme will have 
administrative costs. In case that the costs 
are born by the farmers, this may 
represent a disincentive for them to join. 
                                                 
58 http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2010/sec_2010_1525_2_en.pdf 
59  A labelling scheme identifying product of outermost regions is implemented in the sCMO. 
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further increase the overall positive effect of EU rural 
development measures in favour of short marketing 
chains. It could provide an additional incentive for 
Member States to support short supply chains within 
rural development measures, and thus further 
contribute to inclusive growth.  
• An EU scheme could facilitate sales by very small 
farmers who are not able to participate in other 
schemes which require financial participation by the 
farmer. 
• An EU scheme would allow for more effective 
promotion campaigns and provide better value for 
money, as scarce public expenditure cold focus on a 
single scheme instead of a multitude. 
• An EU scheme reduces / avoids the risk that national 
logos are used to split the internal market. In the past, 
Commission had to intervene vis-à-vis many logos / 
quality schemes set up by regions or Member States 
that were breaching internal market rules. 
• An EU scheme could avoid the legal problem that 
nationally financed "buy local" campaigns easily run 
foul of EU law. 
• An EU scheme would put farmers in Member States 
and regions where no support is currently available for 
short supply chains at the same footing with farmers 
already benefiting from such support, and thus 
contribute to more inclusive growth throughout the 
EU. 
• An EU scheme allows for EU wide recognition of 
products produced at the level of farms and farmers 
producing these products. An EU scheme can 
underline the important role of (often very small) 
farmers to ensure product variety, tradition, cultural 
heritage, and boost their credibility in the eyes of 
consumers.   
• An EU scheme reduces the risk of misleading 
consumers. Consumer choice will increase as the 
consumers will be better informed about the labeled 
products. Labelling at the EU level should help to 
better inform consumers and meet their expectations.  
• Participation of farmers in an EU scheme may 
encourage their collaboration and collective initiatives 
(internet portals, delivery services, creation of farmers' 
markets or other selling points).  
• An EU scheme would create an incentive for all small 
farmers across Europe to become more market-
oriented and thus develop added-value and stimulate 
growth. 
• There will be a need for promotion 
activities at the EU level in order to make 
the EU scheme being recognised and 
understood by consumers. 
• Consumers might consider an EU scheme 
as another scheme among many schemes.  
• Competition between EU scheme and 
national/regional/local schemes with 
regard to promotion activities: promotion 
of an EU scheme might weaken the 
effects of past and ongoing promotion 
activities run by MS/regional/local 
authorities. 
• Co-existence of stricter schemes at 
national level with potentially high 
benefits for producers and an EU scheme. 
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Conclusion 
With these options – rural development measures and an appropriate labelling tool to 
identify product sold through a short marketing chain – direct sales will assist to reduce 
the dependency of farmers on the food supply chain. The benefits should particularly 
accrue to farmers who organise themselves into groups for the purposes inter alia of 
direct marketing. For small and semi-subsistence farmers direct marketing channels are a 
necessity; for more-commercially viable farmers, direct sales through the internet, local 
farmers’ markets, and direct deliveries, should be part of the farmer’s and farmer 
organisation’s armoury in responding to globalisation and the inequalities of bargaining 
power in the food supply chain. 
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ANNEX VI – CONSUMER ISSUES 60 
The EU consumer policy puts consumers' interests and protection at the core of Europe's 
policy. It aims to provide better and more complete information to consumers, to 
promote intra-European purchases and make consumers aware of their rights. The goal is 
to empower consumers by raising awareness and protecting them by making sure that 
products and services sold in the EU are safe, helping national governments to apply EU 
rules, building a strong voice for consumer organisations, and understanding consumers 
better through research and dialogue.  Priorities include increasing consumer confidence 
in the internal market, strengthening consumers’ position in the marketplace and 
ensuring that consumer concerns are taken into account in all EU policies.61   
Food labelling is one of the most effective tools to grant an informed choice to the 
citizen/consumer. The estimated additional administrative cost62 of the EU new food 
labelling proposal63 is expected to be EUR 104 million64. However it is considered that 
the provision of transitional periods and the fact that the legislation aligns with most of 
business' current practices will mean the majority of these costs will be absorbed into 
every day running costs.  
As a consequence of changing global diets and lifestyles the world is now experiencing 
two different nutrition problems - one associated with hunger or nutritional deficiency 
and the other with dietary excess often in the same country, even community. The focus 
on food is no longer only related to food safety or quantity but rather what is now 
deemed the 'dual burden of malnutrition'. Crucially, both underweight and overweight 
individuals may lack important dietary nutrients – minerals and vitamins – that are 
needed for good health. 
Both under-nutrition and over-nutrition are linked with a range of adverse health 
conditions. The underweight are susceptible to poor maternal and infant health as well as 
childhood growth problems and compromised mental development. Meanwhile, obesity 
is associated with such chronic diseases as stroke, hypertension, cardiovascular disease, 
type-2 diabetes, and certain forms of cancer.  
                                                 
60  Extract from the DG SANCO contribution to the Impact Assessment on Health and Consumer 
perspectives 
61  Consumer Policy Strategy 2007-2013 
62  Administrative burden – keeping records, notifying authorities, applying for approval, providing 
information to third parties (http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/better-regulation/administrative-
burdens/action-programme/index_en.htm) 
63  Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the provision of food information to 
consumers 
64  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Action 
Programme for Reducing Administrative Burdens in the EU Sectoral Reduction Plans and 2009 
Actions 
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Together, obesity, cardiovascular diseases (CVD), cancer and diabetes collectively pose 
the greatest burden of disease (77%) in the WHO European Region65 . 
Scientific evidence shows that the access and availability of healthy food have an 
immediate and short term positive influence on health and well being. In particular it has 
been proven to decrease the risk of obesity, reduced risk of chronic illnesses such as 
cardiovascular diseases, various forms of cancer, type II diabetes and obesity in later life. 
Studies evaluating fruit & vegetables interventions in schools reveal that such schemes 
can be a very effective mechanism for improving fruit & vegetables consumption by 
children.66 
In order to allow consumers/citizens the choice for sustainable consumption, the 
provision of information on standards for products and production are important as tools 
of providing transparent information for a risk-aware consumer. 
From a consumer policy perspective, it is essential that quality food products are 
available at affordable prices67. Price is obviously an essential criterion for consumers. A 
recent study showed the different factors of influence on consumer choice for a food 
store. Price is considered as second most important factor, first is proximity of the food 
shop, and third is the quality of food products.68  Quality food products, including 
organic products, are considerably more expensive than conventionally produced food 
because of a higher cost of production.69   
Consumers find distribution chains often long and they are looking for more overview 
and transparency. In this respect, there is also an increasing interest in regional products 
which consumers connect to different aspects, such as fresh food, support of the local 
economy, short supply chain and knowledge of the origin of the product.70  
Food consumption patterns are constantly evolving, reflecting changing lifestyles and 
individual choices of citizens/consumers. Diets have become more diverse and 
substantial over the last decades. Acceptability requires consumer/citizens knowledge 
                                                 
65  WHO Regional Office for Europe: Fact sheet: Tackling Europe's major disease: the challenges and the 
solutions. World Health Organization, Copenhagen, 2006 
66  de Sa, J., Lock, K. 2008: Will EU agricultural policy for school fruit & vegetables improve public 
health? A review of school fruit & vegetable programmes. European Journal of Public Health, 18(6), 
pp. 558–568. 
67  In this context, the Commission will develop guidelines for national web-based and easily accessible 
retail price comparison services for consumer goods (including food) which will be part of a 
Commission Communication on consumer empowerment planned for 2012. 
68  CRIOC, Enseignes, Magasins et Consommateurs, http://www.crioc.be/files/fr/5546fr.pdf 
69  For example, a study showed that the price difference for comparable products was approx. 40%, for 
some products like fruit juices and chocolate, the difference was 80%-100%. GFK, Ergebnisse der 
GfK-Studie zum Konsum von biologisch produzierten Lebensmitteln, 2008;  
http://www.boelw.de/fileadmin/alf/28-bioargumente.pdf 
70  Nestle (editor) 2011: 'Einfluss gesellschaftlicher Veraenderungen auf das Ernaehrungsverhalten', 
2011; 
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and information to make the right choice for healthy food. This includes awareness and 
education but also product information (labelling); while at the same time, ensuring 
quality in production including traditional methods preserving our cultural heritage while 
allowing for responsible innovation.  
In a recent survey71 , the majority of respondents considered that public authorities in the 
EU are doing a good job in protecting them from specific food-related risks, such as 
animal infections and diseases and bacterial contamination. But the survey also shows 
that there is room for improvement, in particular with respect to possible risks from 
chemical contamination and new technologies. Even more so, a majority believes that 
EU public authorities should do more (>80% total agree) to ensure that food is healthy 
and to inform people about healthy diets and lifestyles. This view is consistent across all 
Member States. 
Allowing consumers/citizens access by economic means or rights to acquire nutritionally 
adequate food is especially important for vulnerable social groups, from urban poor to 
landless rural poor. But it also raises the issue of modern supply chains with its emphasis 
on global sourcing and long distance transport versus short supply chains and seasonal 
and local produce and how this affects access to healthy foods. 
 
                                                 
71  Eurobarometer No 354 'Food related risks', 2010 
